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When different parties have claims on an agent for limited aid, the agent must decide whose claims to 
satisfy. Individuals’ claims have a certain strength depending on how much they have to gain by 
receiving aid. To determine which party’s claims to satisfy, some views say that we should simply 
weigh the claims of competing parties against each other. Other views say that we should satisfy the 
set of claims that contains the strongest overall claim and should not do any weighing at all beyond 
this. The Relevance View accepts that we can weigh competing claims but puts a constraint on when 
one kind of claim can outweigh another kind of claim. Claims of one kind must be relevant to claims 
of another kind in order to outweigh them. The Relevance View also stipulates that one kind of claim 
is relevant to another kind of claim if the first claim is sufficiently close in strength to the second 
claim. This thesis aims to develop the best version of the Relevance View and defend it against the 
strongest objections. In Chapter 2, I will situate the Relevance View in relation to competing views 
and determine the best rationale for the view. In Chapter 3, I will defend the Relevance View against 
various sceptical arguments. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will show that the Relevance View can overcome 
certain objections from real-world settings when its scope is properly mapped out. In Chapter 6, I will 
show how the Relevance View can offer guidence when presented with a diverse range of competing 
claims. 
Keywords: Relevance View, Limited Aggregation, Restricted Aggregation, Aggregate Relevant 
Claims, Weak Aggregation, Distributive Justice 
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We cannot always help everyone. Agents are often faced with situations where they must choose 
which group to aid. Take the decision of a publicly funded agency to purchase one drug over another. 
Given the choice between funding a drug that will cure a moderate illness and a drug that will cure a 
severe illness, the fact that the latter drug will help its target patients by a greater amount seems to 
count in its favour. However, another factor that seems to matter in making this decision is the number 
of patients that the respective drugs will help. If one drug will help many people in a population while 
the other drug will help just a few people, this seems to count in favour of the wider-reaching drug. 
If you are the potential recipient of one of these drugs, then we can say that you have a claim of a 
certain strength on this agency. Nearly everyone agrees that the strength of a claim matters. What is 
more controversial is whether the number of claims matter. In this thesis, I will explore a view about 
the circumstances in which the number of claims matter. I will defend a position whereby the 
situations where numbers matter are constrained by a notion of relevance. In order for one kind of 
claim to outweigh another kind of claim, it must be relevant to this claim. One kind of claim is 
relevant to another kind of claim only when these claims are sufficiently close in strength to each 
other. 
1.1 Motivating the Relevance View 
Consider a case where we can either prevent one death or prevent 1,000 people from becoming 
paraplegics. Assume for the sake of simplicity that there are no differences in our relationship with 
any of these parties (for example, that the death-threatened person is under our care). Many hold the 
strong intuition that we should satisfy the claims of the many individuals, each of whom faces a lesser 
harm than the worst placed individual. One way to explain this is that the aggregation of claims to be 
saved from paraplegia is enough to outweigh the single claim not to die. Therefore, it seems that the 
mere number of people with claims can make a difference as to how we should act. However, this 
general observation is not always intuitive. Consider the following World Cup case described by T.M. 
Scanlon: 
Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a television station. 
Electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without turning off 
the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A World Cup match is in progress, watched by many 
people, and it will not be over for an hour. Jones’s injury will not get any worse if we 
wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely painful electrical 
shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until the match is over? Does the right thing to 
do depend on how many people are watching—whether it is one million or five million or 
a hundred million? (Scanlon 1998, p.235). 
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Many will think that failing to save Jones is wrong and that this is true no matter how many football 
fans would be frustrated by temporarily stopping the broadcast. The fans are just trying to watch the 
match whereas Jones is trying to avoid agonising electrocution. One way to explain this intuition is 
that no number of people with weaker claims can outweigh a person with a much stronger claim. This 
says something interesting about aggregating competing claims: when sets of claims compete, the way 
weaker claims work to outweigh stronger claims is not always additive. 
Call the position whereby competing claims add up like stones on a set of balance scales Pure 
Aggregation.1 Pure Aggregation implies that when a set of weaker claims competes with a set of 
stronger claims, there is always some number of weaker claims that can outweigh the set of stronger 
claims. Utilitarianism is a paradigmatic example of Pure Aggregation. Utilitarianism treats claims as 
directly proportional in strength to the interests that they protect and all claims add to the choice-
worthiness of an act. 
A rival position on aggregation which can capture our intuition in the World Cup case is called Anti-
Aggregation. Anti-Aggregation resolves competing claims cases by giving priority to the person with 
the strongest claim. Because Anti-Aggregation explicitly rejects aggregation, it implies that no number 
of weaker claims can ever outweigh a stronger claim. 
Given the pro tanto desirability of identifying a single unified model for how to resolve competing 
claims, I seek to defend an intermediate position between Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation. 
This position is called the Relevance View. The Relevance View states that when a set of weaker 
claims competes with a set of stronger claims because both sets of claims cannot be jointly satisfied, 
the set of weaker claims can outweigh the set of stronger claims when and only when the competing 
claims are sufficiently close in strength.2 Because paraplegia is (let us suppose) almost as bad as death 
for its victim, a sufficient number of claims to prevent paraplegia can successfully aggregate against a 
competing claim to prevent death. So, even though one claim against paraplegia is not enough to 
defeat a claim to prevent death, 1,000 of these claims certainly seems sufficient. Contrast this with the 
World Cup case. Because the claim of any given football fan in the World Cup case is so much weaker 
than the claim of Jones, the claims of any number of football fans cannot outweigh the stronger claim 
of Jones. The set of claims of the football fans is not a “relevant” consideration when helping those 
fans comes at Jones’s expense. This provides a justification for our duty to save Jones. 
 
1 Temkin (2012, p.25) adopts a broader definition of aggregation: “[A] principle of aggregation will be 
any function from the relevant elements—whatever those turn out to be—to the assessment of the 
goodness or the comparative desirability of the item being assessed, say, lives or outcomes.” 
According to this definition, a theory that simply averages competing parties’ claims to determine 
which claims to satisfy is aggregative. Aggregation as I understand it is essentially additive.  




I motivate the Relevance View by drawing conclusions from our intuitions in highly artificial cases. 
Some will object that nothing informative can be drawn from cases that are so impoverished of the 
nuance we see in real-world correlates. I have three initial responses to this objection. First, my aims 
are more explanatory than revisionary. Analysing such cases is important because they isolate morally 
important phenomena. There is certainly a danger in moving from hypothetical thought experiments to 
all things considered conclusions in real-world settings. However, my aims are more modest than that. 
I aim to map out the structure of one component that enters into questions of distributive justice. I use 
artificial cases merely to map out this position; whether or not we have good reason to think that it is 
true depends on whether it explains and informs our moral intuitions in real-world cases. 
My second response to the objection that my reliance on artificial cases is problematic is that I do not 
merely rely on these cases to motivate the Relevance View (although they play a central role). I also 
argue for the view on other sorts of bases. For example, I argue that there is an independently 
appealing rationale for the Relevance View. 
My third response to the objection that my reliance on artificial cases is problematic is that I 
acknowledge the force of this objection in various points throughout the thesis. For example, I discuss 
potential challenges for Relevance View from public-policy-like scenarios that involve risk, rather 
than relying wholly on the artificial set-up of thought experiments under certainty. 
Another inevitably artificial element of this topic is that in order to illustrate the Relevance View, I 
assume a spectrum of claims of increasing strength. For example, I assume that a migraine is worse 
than a headache, that a severe bodily injury is worse than a migraine, and so forth, up until death. Of 
course, these different health-related setbacks will affect different people’s well-being differently. For 
example, incurring a bodily injury may be worse for someone than death in some cases. Indeed, death 
may actually be in someone’s interest on certain accounts of the badness of death. However, I use 
these examples merely to illustrate the view. I do not commit to the view that there is such thing as a 
universal claim to have one’s life saved that is independent of a much richer picture of the actual 
claimant’s circumstances. If the reader disagrees with my ordering, or the strength that I attribute to 
each kind of claim, they are free to use different examples. 
1.3 The competing claims framework  
Claims go towards establishing a duty on the part of the agent (Walen 2019, p.8).3 Suppose patients 
Anne and Barb are each in need of some medicine. However, their doctor, call her Debbie, only has 
 
3 Tadros (2019) asserts that the language of claims commits one to contractualism and prefers to say 
that duty-grounding facts go towards establishing duties. I think Walen (2019) instead successfully 
makes use of the language of claims without being constrained by contractualism. Moreover, I choose 
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one standard dose, and Anne and Barb each require the whole dose to avoid falling ill. Because Anne 
and Barb are each affected by who Debbie decides to give the medicine to, we can say that Anne and 
Barb each have a claim on Debbie. In this situation, Anne’s claim competes with Barb’s claim because 
their claims cannot both be satisfied. Debbie’s duty in this case is determined by the comparative 
strength of Anne’s and Barb’s respective claims. 
The strength of a person’s claim is at least partly determined by the well-being they stand to gain or 
lose, depending on how the agent acts. Anne’s claim reflects her interest in receiving the medicine, 
which is to avoid falling ill. However, claims can also reflect other factors about the situation (Walen 
2019, p.51-3). While I do not commit to any of the following factors, I introduce them merely to 
highlight the flexibility of adopting the language of claims. One possible factor in the situation we are 
considering is how well-off Anne and Barb are relative to each other. If both Anne and Barb have an 
equally strong interest in avoiding illness, but Anne has been burdened with illness her whole life 
whereas Barb has had a relatively healthy life, then we might think that Anne has a stronger claim than 
Barb. The relationship between the patient and the agent may also affect the nature of the claim. 
Suppose for example, that Anne is a registered patient of Debbie but Barb is not; then (so long as this 
does not violate Debbie’s duties as a doctor) Anne’s claim may be stronger claim than Barb’s claim 
along this dimension.4 A patient may also be able to alter their claim by waiving it. Anne may waive 
her claim, for example, generating a duty for Debbie to satisfy Barb’s claim. Finally, whether the 
interest is protected by a claim to not be harmed or a claim to aid may make a difference to the 
strength of one’s claim. 
Of course, sometimes the parties competing for aid will contain more than one member. Suppose, in 
another situation, that Anne, Barb, and Claire are each in need of some medicine and that Doctor 
Debbie only has one standard dose. This time, Barb and Claire only require half a standard dose each 
to receive the full benefits of the medicine. Debbie can either satisfy Anne’s claim to the medicine or 
instead the claims of both Barb and Claire. In this situation, Barb’s and Claire’s claims are aligned. 
Choosing to split the dose between these two people means that both Barb’s claim and Claire’s claims 
are met.5 
The set of competing claims situations is a subset of problems within distributive justice. The 
competing claims framework does not have anything to say about which distribution is best or ideal. 
For example, if one party owns a resource and that resource might better serve another party, then 
transferring this resource might lead to a better distribution of resources. However, this might not be 
 
to use the language of claims because it is simpler to grasp, and because many others in the debate do 
so as well. 
4  It may even have overriding strength. More on this in §2.5.1. In this sense, “nature” seems a better 
way to describe claims than “strength” because a claim may have properties that behave differently in 
different dimensions. 
5 Determining which set of claims to serve is not the end of the story. For example, the group whose 
claims were not satisfied may have secondary claims to compensation. See, Walen (2019, p.101). 
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an instance of competing claims because the first parties’ ownership of the resource restricts others 
having a claim on the resource. 
To narrow my focus even more, in the cases I focus on, the agent is always thwarting one group’s 
claims and serving another group’s claims. I will not consider cases, for example, where somebody is 
being used as a means to satisfy another person’s claim. Moreover, unless otherwise stated, I also 
assume that all patients have the same level of well-being and have not waived their claims. This 
narrower range of cases will have direct implications for how we deal with a broader range of 
competing claims cases where the morally relevant factors are more numerous. 
1.4 Roadmap 
The aim of this thesis is to offer a general defence of the Relevance View. My aim is not to show that 
the Relevance View is the best view all things considered, only that it is a serious contender with a 
number of merits. 
The Relevance View is motivated by the fact that it can capture two important intuitions that seem to 
pull in opposite directions: from the World Cup case, the intuition that aggregation is sometimes 
morally inappropriate; and from the Life versus Paraplegia case, the intuition that aggregation is 
sometimes morally appropriate. The Relevance View explains why aggregation is morally appropriate 
in some cases but not in others: we should only aggregate when competing claims are sufficiently 
close in strength. But without something deeper said in favour of it, the Relevance View does seem to 
lack a theoretical basis that, I will argue, two of its main rivals—Pure Aggregation and Anti-
Aggregation—share. I address this issue in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 2 has dual aims. The first is to situate the Relevance View in relation to rival theories and 
within the tradition of deontological moral theory. The second aim of Chapter 2 is to establish a 
rationale—a theoretical source of appeal—for the Relevance View. 
In Chapter 3, I will consider a number of expressions of scepticism about the intuitions that motivate 
the Relevance View. Both proponents of Pure Aggregation and proponents of Anti-Aggregation have 
come up with creative ways to explain why our intuitions in the World Cup and Life versus Paraplegia 
cases are mistaken. I will argue that our intuitions are not vulnerable to these arguments. I also 
entertain another sceptical worry about finding a single model to adjudicate between competing 
claims. 
Chapters 4 and 5 aim examine the Relevance View in various practical settings including iterated 
choices, situations involving risk, and the provision of publicly funded healthcare. These chapters aim 
to show that the Relevance View’s scope of application in these settings is limited.  
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In Chapter 4, I will discuss how the Relevance View can address problems to do with iteration and 
risk. If an agent repeatedly acts in accordance with the Relevance View, it seems that she commits 
herself to bringing about situations where everybody is worse off than if she had not acted in this way. 
It would be desirable if we could find a justification for why the Relevance View would not apply in 
these situations. The next challenge to the Relevance View I consider is when taking a risk is in 
everyone’s ex ante interest, but seems to generate a violation of the Relevance View after the risk has 
taken place. I argue for how best to respond to this challenge. 
Chapter 5 builds on the ideas of Chapter 4. One counter-intuitive implication of the Relevance View is 
that it seems to recommend moving all of our public health resources that currently treat minor 
ailments to treating major health-burdens. I explore ways in which the truth of the Relevance View 
might be consistent with our resourcing of treatments for minor ailments. For example, there may be 
further democratic reasons to keep our practices as is. I also expand my discussion of how Relevance 
View can deal with risk where not all parties benefit from the risk being taken. 
In Chapter 6, I explore recent attempts to extend the Relevance View to cases that are more complex 
than the simple cases that motivate the view. Up until this point I only use cases where a set of claims 
of a given strength compete with another set of claims that are either (a) much stronger, (b) slightly 
stronger, or (c) the same strength. However, a new set of problems emerge when three groups rather 
than two groups compete for the same resource. This is another important hurdle if the Relevance 
View is to be able to explain a broad range of cases that might be relevant to real-world settings such 
as healthcare prioritisation. Chapter 6 concludes the substantive chapters of this thesis. 
In Chapter 7, I begin by offering a summary of what I have argued in Chapters 2–6. I then move onto 
drawing some general conclusions about the scope of my arguments and identifying some areas for 
future research. 
This thesis also includes two short appendices. Appendix A and Appendix B each respond to a major 
focal point in Chapter 4. Appendix A is on an alternative line of response to the Argument from Risk 
that I argue is ultimately unsuccessful. Appendix B addresses epistemic considerations that have been 
debated in relation to ex ante reasoning. My reason for separating these discussions out as appendices 
is to maintain the momentum of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 
The Rationale Behind the Relevance View 
In this chapter I will work towards establishing the strongest rationale for the Relevance View. The 
Relevance View posits that a weaker set of claims has the potential to outweigh a stronger set of 
claims only if the weaker claims are relevant to the stronger claims. The Relevance View is initially 
motivated by explaining two intuitions that neither Pure Aggregation nor Anti-Aggregation can 
explain alone. I explain the cases that motivate these intuitions again in §2.1. The Relevance View is 
often characterised as a middle way between Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation because it can 
capture both of these intuitions. In §2.2 and §2.3 I expose the rationales behind Pure Aggregation and 
Anti-Aggregation, respectfully. In §2.4 I distinguish the Relevance View from other related views. In 
§2.5 I situate the Relevance View within a wider moral tradition. This sets us up to start evaluating a 
rationale for the Relevance View. In §2.6 I outline and appraise Alex Voorhoeve’s (2014) idea that 
relevance is essentially related to taking up what he calls the “permissible personal perspective”. In 
§2.7 I outline and appraise an alternative rationale due to Alec Walen (forthcoming) called Weak 
Aggregation. I argue that the second of these proposals is the more successful. 
2.1 The intuitive problem again 
Pure Aggregation implies that there is always some number of weaker claims that can outweigh a set 
of competing stronger claims. However, this seems incompatible with our intuition in the World Cup 
case (Scanlon 1998, p.235). In the World Cup case, Scanlon asks us to imagine a scenario where we 
can save Jones from agonising electrocution in the broadcast station only by stopping the broadcast 
and frustrating some large number of football fans. It seems obvious to many that we should stop the 
broadcast and save Jones, and that this is true no matter how many football fans will be thereby 
disrupted. Contrary to Pure Aggregation, the World Cup case intuition implies that no number of 
weaker claims to have the broadcast continue can outweigh Jones’s claim to be saved from 
electrocution. 
Anti-Aggregation holds that we commit a kind of moral mistake when we aggregate claims across 
individuals. Claims just do not “add up” in the way Pure Aggregation assumes they do. Without 
aggregation, identifying the overall strongest claim is one way to decide which set of competing 
claims to satisfy. This criterion provides a justification for satisfying Jones’s claim in the World Cup 
case, because in that case Jones has the strongest individual claim. However, many people feel that 
aggregation remains appropriate in situations where the competing claims are closer together in 
strength. Consider, for example, Life versus Paraplegia: even if death is worse than paraplegia, given 
the choice between preventing one death and preventing 1,000 cases of paraplegia, many hold the 
intuition that we ought to satisfy the claims of the potential paraplegics. Pure Aggregation and Anti-
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Aggregation resolve in distinct ways cases where claims compete. But can some broader theoretical 
considerations capture the source of the appeal of these divergent positions? 
2.2 The appeal of Pure Aggregation 
I follow Nagel (1979) in thinking that the attraction of various theories of distributive justice is the 
way that they conceptualise equality.6 Utilitarianism is the most influential form of Pure Aggregation. 
Nagel conceptualises utilitarianism’s interpretation of equality as follows: 
The moral equality of utilitarianism is a kind of majority rule: each person’s interests 
count once, but some may be outweighed by others. It is not really a majority of persons 
that determines the result, but a majority of interests suitably weighted for intensity. 
Persons are equal in the sense that each of them is given a ‘vote’ weighted in proportion 
to the magnitude of his interests. Although this means that the interests of a minority can 
sometimes outweigh the interests of a majority, the basic idea is majoritarian because 
each individual is accorded the same (variable) weight and the outcome is determined by 
the largest total. (Nagel 1979, p.112) 
Other popular theories of distributive justice build on utilitarianism’s understanding of equality by also 
being sensitive to people’s level of well-being. One common view is that the worse off someone is, the 
more that their interests count. To take Nagel’s analogy further, each person’s vote is not only 
weighted in proportion to the magnitude of their interests, but it is weighted more if they are worse off. 
These theories come under the name of either prioritarianism (Parfit 2012) or egalitarianism (Otsuka 
& Voorhoeve 2009). Prioritarianism determines how poorly someone is doing on an absolute level, 
whereas egalitarianism determines how poorly someone is doing by comparing them to others. In this 
sense egalitarianism is a relational account of priority.7 
By their very nature, all theories of Pure Aggregation are unable to rule that we should always save 
Jones from electrocution in the World Cup case. It does not matter how much we strengthen Jones’s 
claim to reflect how poorly he is doing; some number of weaker claims can always outweigh Jones’s 
claim. (There is always some number of grains of sand that can outweigh a jumbo jet.) 
 
6 As I introduce these theoretical sources of appeal, I mean to be neutral between consequentialism and 
non-consequentialism. For example, Maximin rejects Pure Aggregation and can be represented as a 
consequentialist position. Maximin could be represented as the position that the best state of affairs is 
where the worst-off person is as well-off as they can be. Here, everyone else’s interests make no 
difference to the value of the state of affairs. 
7 One question that can be asked of both of these theories is: how to understand the scope of well-
being that is the basis for attributing priority? For example, is priority based on how well someone’s 
life is going on the whole or how they are doing at the time they face the threat? Scanlon (1998, 
pp.227-8) offers a more flexible idea when he suggests that different aspects of well-being will be 
relevant in different contexts. For example, suppose an agent can alleviate two out of five months of 
pain for Anne, or two out of two months of pain for Barb. On a relational understanding of priority, 
Anne’s claim would be strengthened relative to Barb’s claim to reflect the fact that Anne faces three 
additional months of pain regardless of whose claim is ultimately satisfied. So, the fact that Anne had 
a bad childhood, for example, may not necessarily be a relevant aspect of welfare in this case. 
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Thus, Pure Aggregation can be understood as the position that proper moral concern for all claimants 
requires treating their claims as adding to or subtracting from the choice-worthiness of an act over 
alternative acts. As well as justifying intuitions elicited in such cases as Life versus Paraplegia, where 
a number of claims against paraplegia outweigh a single claim against death, Pure Aggregation finds 
support from the attractive principle that links proper moral concern to the idea that any claim can 
make an actual difference to the way an agent should act in any given circumstance. If each fan’s 
claim weighs equally in an agent’s decision, then enough of these claims should be able to tip the 
balance of claims in favour of letting the broadcast continue. This contrasts with Anti-Aggregation 
where agents are guided to act on the basis of just the strongest overall claim. How appealing one 
finds Pure Aggregation’s conceptualisation of equality will influence how difficult it will be to bite the 
bullet in the World Cup case.8 
2.3 The appeal of Anti-Aggregation 
Nagel (1979, p.125) contrasts his own egalitarian view with a “more uncompromising type” of priority 
for the person with the strongest claim. Nagel argues that this priority can be defended using a form of 
moral reasoning he calls “pairwise comparison”. Nagel believes “that the general form of moral 
reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes” (p.126). He continues: 
[This] includes a separate concern for each person, and it is realized by looking at the 
world from each person's point of view separately and individually, rather than by 
looking at the world from a single comprehensive point of view. Imaginatively one must 
split into all the people in the world, rather than turn oneself into a conglomeration of 
them. 
According to Nagel, the most natural way to choose amongst competing claims while staying true to 
everyone’s separate point of view is to “give priority to the most urgent individual claims” (p.127). 
Suppose that Anne and Barb have competing claims on our aid, and that Anne’s claim is stronger than 
Barb’s claim. When one compares these claims, one is compelled to serve Anne’s claim. To further 
illustrate this pairwise method, suppose that Claire also has a claim on us for aid and her claim is 
aligned with Barb’s claim. If Claire’s claim is also weaker than Anne’s claim, then our pairwise 
judgement is unchanged: Anne’s claim presents itself as the most important when compared to either 
Barb’s or Claire’s claim. Staying true to the pairwise method compels us to serve Anne’s claim. This 
 
8 One further reason Pure Aggregation seems attractive in the domain of competing claims we are 
considering is that claims merely vary in strength along the same dimension. Contrast this with 
situations where claims are of different kinds. For example, if Elma owns a resource and this resource 
could make a great number of people happy for a day, we might think that Elma’s property claim to 
this resource prevents (or protects) other peoples’ claims from outweighing her claim. This makes 
sense because Elma’s claim is of a different kind to the claims of the would-be happy people. 
However, in the cases we are considering, all claims fall on the same continuum of strength, they all 
related to something like health-related well-being, and so we might presume that all claims in these 
settings should have equal marginal importance.   
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is one explanation of our intuitions in the World Cup case. When comparing Jones’s claim to the claim 
of each football fan taken alone, serving Jones’s claim is far more important. 
Anti-Aggregation rejects the intuition in the Life versus Paraplegia case, and would instead 
recommend serving the single claim against death rather than the 1,000 claims against paraplegia on 
the grounds that this single claim is the strongest claim. However, this approach appears to offer no 
solution when the competing claims are equal in strength. If Anne’s claim is equally as strong as each 
of Barb and Claire’s claims, nobody’s claim is the most urgent. One common suggestion in this 
situation is that all an agent can do is offer equal chances through a fair procedure, such as a coin toss 
(Taurek 1977). 
As Nagel himself recognises, these two different ways of resolving competing claim conflicts rely on 
different and credible justifications. Pure Aggregation treats proper moral concern for each individual 
as taking their claims to “add up” together with the claims of other individuals. Anti-Aggregation 
treats proper moral concern as staying “closer to the points of view of the individuals considered” 
(p.123). 
2.4 The Relevance View 
The Relevance View is a middle way between Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation. According to 
the Relevance View, aggregation is morally appropriate in some cases and not in others. Aggregation 
is appropriate only when competing claims are ‘relevant’ to one another where relevance is 
determined by whether two competing claims are ‘close enough’ in strength.9 In the Life Versus 
Paralysis case, the two kinds of competing claims are significant relative to each other in that they are 
“close enough” in strength, and so aggregation is appropriate. This is to say that some number of 
claims against paralysis could defeat a competing claim against death. Things are different when we 
consider the World Cup case. Jones’s claim to be rescued from electrocution is much stronger than the 
claim of any given football fan to watch the match on TV. The difference in what is at stake means 
that these competing claims are not relevant to each other. Therefore, no number of these weaker 
claims can defeat Jones’s stronger claim. 
I will now work towards uncovering the theoretical appeal of the Relevance View, to establish the 
view as a plausible contender alongside Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation. My first task will be 
to situate the Relevance View by differentiating it from and highlighting its advantages over related 
views. 
 
9 Voorhoeve (2014, p.65 fn. 2) offers a list of philosophers who have defended a view like this.  
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2.4.1 The Threshold View 
One way in which consequentialists have tried to accommodate our intuitions in the World Cup and 
Life versus Paraplegia cases is by introducing the idea of value superiority. Mill (1961, II 6) famously 
makes the distinction between higher and lower pleasures, such that no number of lower pleasures can 
outweigh a higher pleasure. Using this idea in the current setting, when claims cross some threshold of 
strength, no number of claims below this threshold can outweigh the claims above this threshold. The 
Threshold View could say that Jones’s claim and the claims of the football fans lie on either side of 
this threshold, whereas the claims of the potential paraplegics and the claim of the person facing death 
each lie above this threshold. 
However, the Threshold View seems to lead to counter-intuitive results when the claims being 
compared fall just on either side of the threshold. For example, if this threshold is equivalent to a claim 
against having two broken limbs, then the Threshold View would imply that no number of claims to 
have a single limb spared can outweigh even a single claim to have three limbs spared. However, these 
claims seem close enough in strength such that enough of one claim can outweigh the other. 
By contrast, the Relevance View holds that whether one claim can outweigh another claim depends on 
the strength of these claims relative to each other. For example, a weak claim may be relevant to a 
moderate claim, a moderate claim may be relevant to a strong claim, and yet a weak claim may not be 
relevant to a strong claim. 
A related idea is that morality is just not concerned with trivial claims such as the claim to have the 
football broadcast continue. For example, if duties of beneficence are concerned only with others’ life-
projects, then it is not obvious that mild doses of frustration are objects of beneficence at all. Another 
way of putting it is that the interests of the football fans in the broadcast continuing do not ground 
beneficence claims on an agent.10 My first objection to this idea is that finding the point at which 
people’s interests are no longer the objects of beneficent concern will face similar problems to those 
just outlined, where claims falling on either side of this threshold will seem relevant to each other. My 
second objection is that while it is true that trivial interests do not typically ground beneficence duties 
(i.e., are the objects of claims), this is not because they cannot ground such duties. Instead, it is 
because the beneficence duties they would ground would typically be too demanding. If I were to go 
out of my way every time that I could fulfil another’s very small interest, I plausibly would be robbed 
of the freedom to live my own life. Finally, if the electrical equipment had not fallen on Jones, then 
turning off the broadcast for no other good reason would definitely be wrong. This would be a case 
where ‘trivial’ interests do ground duties of beneficence. 
 
10 Hirose (2015, p.46) raises a similar question but it is not clear how his use of trivial differs from 
relevance. See also Bramble (2019) where he argues that only impacts on lifetime well-being have 
normative significance. 
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I conclude that the Relevance View has distinct advantages over alternative views that aim to explain 
our intuitions in the motivating cases using absolute thresholds. 
2.4.2 Maximin 
In this section I contrast the Relevance View with an Anti-Aggregationist rival called Maximin. 
Maximin is the principle that we should distribute resources so as to make the worst off people the 
least worst off that they can be.11 The idea is to maximise the well-being of the people with the least 
amount (minimum) of well-being. Thus described, Maximin is a distinctly Anti-Aggregationist view. 
However, another contrasting feature of Maximin and the Relevance View is the scope of the claims 
in consideration. Suppose that some football fans in the World Cup case have had particularly 
impoverished lives whereas Jones has lived a comparably privileged life. Maximin would recommend 
letting the broadcast continue in this case because the worst off individuals can be made ever so 
slightly better off.  
However, the Relevance View may still recommend saving Jones, who has the strongest claim in this 
much more narrow domain of competing claims. Note also that the Relevance View may still conceive 
of claims as reflecting how poorly someone is doing as well as how much they have to gain by the 
agent acting in their favour. If some number of football fans have lives that are going much worse than 
Jones’s life, then the claims of the football fans may be stronger than if they were doing as well as 
Jones. Still, so long as the claim of any given football fan is sufficiently weaker than Jones’s claim, the 
Relevance View would recommend saving Jones. Therefore, at least in the context of competing 
claims situations, the Relevance View is superior to Maximin. 
2.4.3 Scanlon and tie-breaking 
Scanlon (1998) presents his moral theory as distinctly anti-aggregative in nature.12 However, Scanlon 
argues that we may be justified in letting numbers break ties. Suppose, for example, that Doctor 
Debbie only has Anne and Barb as patients, and they have competing claims on Debbie for the single 
dose of medicine. In this case, Debbie has a permission to help either individual. However, before 
Debbie acts, Claire is admitted to the hospital and is also in need of the same medicine. Barb and 
Claire only require half a dose of medicine while Anne requires a full dose, so Debbie can either give 
the dose to Anne or split it between Barb and Claire. Scanlon (1998, p.232) argues that in cases such 
as this, it would be disrespectful to Barb and Claire to save Anne; it would be as though the addition of 
either of their claims to the competition made no difference and counted for nothing. According to 
 
11 Hirose (2015, p.28). Maximin is most famously expressed in the writings of Rawls (1971). 
12 Scanlon’s idea that individuals alone can reasonably reject principles is the foundation of the theory. 
One circumstance of reasonable rejection concerns how the most burdened person fares under this or 
that principle. An individual can reject a principle if they would be better off under another principle 
and nobody else would be more worse off than them (p.230). 
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Scanlon’s justification, because numbers can break ties, Debbie may be required to split the dose.13 
This tie-breaking argument is anti-aggregative because the disrespect we show Barb is independent of 
the disrespect we show Claire. 
It would be a mistake to ignore Scanlon’s own contribution to the development of the Relevance 
View. Scanlon (1998, p.238-41) explores a way of extending the tie-breaking argument to work over a 
broader range of cases. Suppose that Barb and Claire each have a claim that is only slightly weaker 
than Anne’s claim. Scanlon feels inclined to say that the agent may still be permitted to save Barb and 
Claire. Saving Anne would ignore the fact that the claims of Barb and Claire are almost as strong as 
the claim of Anne. Scanlon’s (1998, p.239) tolerance of numbers is thus restricted by a notion of 
relevance: the number of claimants can break ties only if the competing claims, taken individually, are 
close enough in significance to each other. 
However, the major problem with Scanlon’s argument is that there is a certain arbitrariness in 
allowing tie-breaking and not aggregation. After all, tie-breaking already acknowledges that claims are 
commensurable (Liao 2008, p.445), and so goes beyond looking at claims in isolation as the pairwise 
method, for example, would have us do. To break ties, claims must be matched against each other. In 
my view, tie-breaking is best thought of as a heuristic for aggregation: it allows us to decide on the 
basis of what is left over when competing claims cancel, and this is easier than determining the 
aggregate strength of competing claims. Rather than attributing to each claim some determinate 
strength and weighing these claims against each other like we would with rocks on a set of balance 
scales, tie-breaking allows us to count the mere number of claims on each side to determine a verdict 
without determining the strength of any given claim (so long as they are close-enough in strength).  
Verdicts based on tie-breaking with relevance would come apart from the Relevance View because the 
tie-breaking argument counts the mere number of claimants, and is not sensitive to the strength of the 
claims as long as they are relevant. When large numbers are involved, an error will accrue if we rely 
only on tie-breaking because tie-breaking is not being sensitive to the marginal strength of each claim. 
Suppose, for example, that 100 claims against death compete with 101 claims against paraplegia and 
claims against death are relevant to claims against paraplegia. Scanlon’s method would have us choose 
to satisfy the claims of the largest number of claimants, the people facing paraplegia. On the other 
hand, the Relevance View would have us choose to prevent the deaths. Even if the competing claims 
were closer together in strength, ignoring the significance of these differences on the individuals 
affected seems unnecessary. 
 
13 Hirose (2015) points out that this reasoning is fully consistent with a weighted lottery. Suppose that 
Anne is given a blue marble and Barb a red marble in a lottery. Claire’s addition to the group could 
contribute another red marble to the lottery rather than determining that Doctor Debbie now ought to 
serve both her claim and Barb’s claim. This way Anne still has a chance of having her claim served, 
albeit only a 1 in 3 chance.  
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2.4.4 Conclusion 
I conclude that the Relevance View is different from and has advantages over the Threshold View, 
Maximin, and Scanlon’s tie-breaking argument. The Relevance View determines relevance on the 
basis of the comparative strength of competing claims rather than on the basis of whether these claims 
fall on either side of a threshold as the Threshold View does. The kind of concern that the Relevance 
View shows for the person with the strongest claim is more narrowly construed than in Maximin, and 
unlike Maximin, the Relevance View is not Anti-Aggregative. The Relevance View also explicitly 
accepts aggregation in certain circumstances, unlike Scanlon who tries to arrive at similar conclusions 
using some variety of “proto-aggregation”. Now that I have differentiated the Relevance View from 
related views, I will work towards deepening my theoretical characterisation of the view. 
2.5 The Relevance View and deontology 
In this section I advance a deontological way of understanding the Relevance View. Deontology is a 
particularly illuminating way of understanding the Relevance View, although I am agnostic as to 
whether the Relevance View can be defended within consequentialism (see, for example, Temkin 
2012). I understand deontology simply as any view that constrains how agents may (permissibly) 
bring about certain outcomes. I focus on deontology rather than consequentialism for several related 
reasons. 
First, the notion of relevance can be considered just one of many constraints on maximising the good 
that deontologists have explored. Some argue that when one acts in such a way as to ignore relevance, 
there is a wrongful kind of disrespect shown to the person with the stronger claim (e.g., Kamm 2007). 
This idea also fits with another contrast to consequentialism: that there is more than one response 
towards things that have fundamental moral importance. Whereas consequentialists claim that the only 
appropriate response to the good is that of promotion, many non-consequentialists claim that there are 
other appropriate responses, such as respect.14 I will draw on this idea at multiple times throughout this 
thesis. 
The second reason I explore the Relevance View within deontology is that introducing relevance 
seems to give rise to certain intransitive relations. Transitivity is where if A bears a relation to B and B 
bears the same relation to C, then A bears this relation to C. For example, if A is taller than B, and B is 
taller than C, then we can assume that A is also better than C. By contrast intransitivity is where the 
consequent is denied. For example, where A is better than B and B is better than C and yet A is not 
better than C we can conclude that the “better than” relation is not transitive. Intransitivity of the 
‘better than’ relation is something consequentialists are reluctant to embrace but the intransitive ‘ought 
to, rather than’ relation poses no particular challenges to the non-consequentialist (Kamm 2007; 
 
14 See, for example, Swanton (2003). 
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Temkin 2012). Thus deontology seems more accommodating of intransitivity than consequentialism. I 
will explore questions of transitivity in Chapter 6. 
In Chapters 4 & 5 I show that the notion of waiving a claim can make sense of how an agent should 
act under conditions of risk. Without pre-empting that argument here, I will note that the notion of 
waiving one’s claim is particularly suited to deontology. One of the key tenets of deontology is 
respecting a person’s powers over the domain of their own welfare. Consequentialism on the other 
hand, with its focus on interests, doesn’t offer individuals the same discretion over the duties of a 
beneficent agent.15 
A fourth reason for favouring deontology in this setting is that relevance might be just one species of a 
more general defeating relation within deontology (Tadros 2019). I will explore this idea now because 
it demystifies the notion of relevance that is the key insight behind the Relevance View. 
2.5.1 Two kinds of defeating 
The Relevance View seems to make use of two possible ways in which claims can interact, or more 
specifically, ways that one claim can defeat another (Tadros 2019). First, one set of claims can defeat 
another set of claims simply because it outweighs this set of claims. In the Life versus Paraplegia 
case, this is one very plausible explanation of the agent’s duty to serve the claims of the many 
potential paraplegics, rather than the claim of the single person facing death. Because the many claims 
against paraplegia outweigh the single claim against death, the claims against paraplegia prevent the 
claim against death from establishing a duty. 
By contrast, it seems incorrect to say that Jones’s claim outweighs the aggregate claims of the fans. If 
a weighing relation were involved, then we would expect that the claims of some number of fans 
would outweigh Jones’s claim. Instead, as the Relevance View suggests, the claims of the fans are not 
relevant when satisfying these would mean leaving Jones to suffer painful electrocution. We can say 
instead that Jones’s claim disables the force of any given fan’s claim from its potential to outweigh 
Jones’s claim. 
Tadros (2019) offers another example of this relation at play in deontology. The example is between 
the duty of a doctor and the consent of their patient. Even if it would be strictly better for a patient that 
their doctor operate on them without their consent, if the patient does not consent and they have the 
capacity to do so, then the absence of their consent disables any duty to promote the good that the 
doctor might have in this case.16 In this case, without consent, the prospect of promoting someone’s 
 
15 Of course, consequentialists often appeal to ‘subjective’ interests or preferences. While this lets 
people’s own preference determine what is good for them, it does not give them the power to 
withdraw this preference at their will.  
16 Cullity (2018) calls a similar phenomenon context-undermining: for example, patient A has control 
of a domain of his well-being such that the absence of his consent disables any opposing duties of 
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welfare does not translate into a duty to promote their welfare. A similar phenomenon explains why 
the severity of Jones’s claim prevents the claims of the football fans from grounding a duty on our part 
that their claims be served. The analogy works well because just as the size of the benefit to the patient 
does not seem to make a difference to whether the doctor has a duty to perform the surgery without 
consent, the number of fans does not seem to make a difference to whether the agent should save 
Jones. 
The constraint of respect is important in explaining both cases. The doctor disrespects the patient by 
assuming that a large enough benefit outweighs their consent. Likewise, we disrespect Jones in the 
World Cup case when we act as though very small annoyances, even in great numbers, are the kinds of 
things that can outweigh his claim. This constraint on maximising the good is a common theme in the 
deontological moral tradition. 
2.5.2 Numbers scepticism 
Some people think that any kind of aggregation violates a core tenet of deontology: the Separateness 
of Persons. According to proponents of the Separateness of Persons, when Pure Aggregation adds 
claims together to determine which set of claims to serve, it fails to treat each individual (and their 
claim) as separate from any other. One way of pressing the Separateness of Persons complaint is that 
trade-offs between the interests of competing individuals (or groups) do not resolve themselves in the 
same manner, or as easily, as does the trade-off of interests within a single person. When we elect to 
have a surgery, for example, we often set back our short-term interests for the sake of satisfying a 
more substantial long-term interest (such as ensuring mobility for an extended period of time). 
However, when we impose a burden on one person so that a different person can receive a more 
substantial benefit, that is no compensation for the person on whom the burden was imposed. 
However, the Relevance View is silent on how to address intrapersonal trade-offs and so it is not 
obvious how the Relevance View violates the Separateness of Persons and therefore a central 
deontological constraint. The Relevance View only applies in situations that involve competing claims 
belonging to different individuals. Moreover, in the cases we have been considering we are not 
imposing a burden on someone to benefit another. Nowhere does the view imply that satisfying one 
set of claims compensates for the claims unsatisfied, if the agent could satisfy both sets of claims then 
they would. Instead, the groups involved have competing claims to our aid; we are not harming one 
group to benefit another. To the extent that harming one person in order to benefit another is 
permissible, this must be because the claim of the person to receive this benefit is significantly 
stronger than the claim of the person being harmed. 
 
beneficence. Also, there are some difficult cases where consent is difficult to obtain and so this 
disabling relation may not hold.  
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Walen (2019) notes that many of deontologist’s favourite puzzles rely on interpersonal aggregation for 
their intelligibility. In the standard trolley problem, for example, a trolley is heading towards five 
people. A bystander can either let the five die or pull a lever, diverting the trolley onto a side track 
with one person. Many deontologists endorse the principle that killing is worse than letting die. As 
Walen (2019, pp.51-2) correctly observes, if deontologists attribute a stronger claim to the person on 
the side track than to any individual in the way of the trolley, then if diverting the trolley is morally 
required, this must be entirely because of the numbers. Walen (2019, p.53) also reminds us that when 
deontologists claim that killing is worse than letting die, they are not saying that it is worse for the one 
who dies. They are merely saying (to put it abstractly) that killing should weigh more negatively in 
determining an agent’s action than letting die does. 
I conclude this section by restating that the Relevance View is firmly at home within deontology. The 
view readily makes use of the distinction between outweighing and disabling where the disabling 
relation is plausibly understood as a constraint on maximising the good. Finally, the Relevance View 
violates no definitive deontological restriction. 
2.6 Determining relevance 
Even if the Relevance View captures our judgements in the World Cup case and Life versus 
Paraplegia case, and relevance is just an instance of the disabling relationship we see elsewhere in 
ethics, we might think that the Relevance View requires a principled way of determining when one 
claim is relevant to another. One reason that determining a test is particularly important is because 
people’s intuitions will diverge widely. Pure Aggregation takes this to an extreme by taking the 
position that all competing harms are relevant to each other. In this section, I explore Voorhoeve’s 
attractive method for determining when competing claims are relevant to each other. 
2.6.1 Voorhoeve’s test 
Suppose that two groups, A and B, have competing claims on some resource, and the claimants within 
each group have claims of the same strength. This condition holds in the World Cup case where the 
football fans have identical claims and these claims compete with Jones’s claim. This condition also 
holds in the Life versus Paraplegia case, where the claims of the many people facing the threat of 
paraplegia compete with the claim of one person facing the threat of death. Voorhoeve believes that 
relevance can be determined by analysing a competition between a single claimant from Group A and 
a single claimant from Group B. Call this a one-one competition and call a representative from Group 
A, A, and a representative from Group B, B. In a one-one competition, we first need to ask whether or 
not A should prefer that B’s claim be satisfied rather than his own claim out of minimal moral concern 
for B. If A may prefer that his own claim be satisfied rather than B’s claim, then claims of the same 
strength of A’s claim are relevant to claims of the same strength of B’s claim. On the other hand, if A 
should prefer that B’s claim is satisfied rather than his own, then claims of the same strength of A’s 
 18 
claim are NOT relevant to claims of the same strength of B’s claim. According to Voorhoeve, the 
legitimacy of A’s preferences in these cases is guided by “minimal moral concern” for B. Minimal 
moral concern involves some preference for the satisfaction of one’s own claim: A may legitimately 
prefer the satisfaction of his own claim as long as B’s claim is not “too much” larger than A’s claim. 
To illustrate how this works, consider a case in which members of Group A face the prospect of a 
headache, and members of Group B face the prospect of an early death. In a one-one competition, 
minimal moral concern seems to require that A prefer the satisfaction of B’s claim over his own. 
Therefore, claims to have one’s headache prevented are not relevant to claims to have one’s life saved. 
Consider a different case in which members of Group A now face the prospect of losing a limb. In a 
one-one competition, minimal moral concern does not seem to require that A prefer the satisfaction of 
B’s claim over his own. A may retain his preference that his own claim be satisfied over B’s claim. 
Therefore, claims to have a limb saved are relevant to claims that one’s life be saved.  
Voorhoeve’s test for relevance seems to match our intuitions in the World Cup and Life versus 
Paraplegia cases. If I were the only one watching the football match broadcast I should prefer that the 
broadcast be stopped for the sake of Jones. On the other hand, if a trolley is either going to paralyse 
me or kill another, it would be appropriate for me to prefer that I be saved. But what other reasons 
does Voorhoeve have for favouring his test? Voorhoeve (2014) believes that “a form of unanimity 
emerges” (p.74) when everyone with a weaker claim realises that, in a one-one competition, they 
should prefer that the competing claimant’s claim should be served. An individual can hardly 
complain that their claim is not satisfied in a one-many competition––so this reasoning goes––if they 
would be required to prefer that their competitor’s claim be satisfied in a one-one competition. I will 
now explore two objections to Voorhoeve’s test. 
2.6.2 Unanimity objection 
My first objection to Voorhoeve’s test for relevance is that it is not clear why this one-one relation 
should necessarily translate into any many-one relation. Tadros (2019, p.177) explains that when I am 
the only one who can provide someone with a great benefit at a minor cost to myself, I plausibly have 
a duty to do so. However, when providing the same benefit to someone would require many people to 
incur an identical minor cost, it is less clear that each of us has a duty to do so. Tadros gives the 
following example: 
[S]uppose I am watching television and I see a person struggling to get his shopping 
home. I might be required to stop watching and help. It does not follow that any number 
of people who are watching television must all stop to help if that is the only way to 
relieve the person’s burden. (Tadros 2019, p.177) 
Whether I am morally required to benefit someone may depend on whether or not other people would 
be similarly burdened in order to provide this benefit. No doubt, Tadros uses an odd counterexample, 
but I think it successfully diagnoses the flaw in Voorhoeve’s test. Voorhoeve needs to say why the 
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unanimity that emerges from each person considering their morally informed preference in a one-one 
competition has anything to do with how the agent should choose in a many-one competition. 
2.6.3 A tracking problem 
Even granted the conclusion of the previous section, patients’ moral preferences in one-one 
competitions and an agent’s duties in one-many competitions rely on the relative strength of 
competing claims. If the concept of “minimal moral concern” is correct, a claimant’s preference that 
their competitor’s claim be satisfied depends on how much stronger their competitor’s claim is than 
their own claim. Similarly, if the Relevance View is correct, an agent’s duty to satisfy one set of 
claims over another set of claims depends on how much stronger claims of one kind are than claims of 
another kind. Therefore, Voorhoeve might have simply identified a helpful correlation: we can use 
one-one competitions to guide us in claims competitions. 
However, Tadros (2019) argues that there is precedent in ethics for thinking that what is acceptable for 
a claimant is different from what is acceptable for an agent. When A endorses, out of minimal moral 
concern for B, satisfying B’s claim rather than his own, he is making a kind of personal sacrifice. It is 
true that what A is required to sacrifice for the sake of B correlates with the burden we are permitted to 
impose on A for the sake of B. However, in the rescue cases we have been considering, the situation 
looks very different from the perspective of the agent. Failing to serve one set of claims is a mere side 
effect of serving the competing set of claims. In deontology, the distinction between imposing a 
burden on someone as a means to benefiting someone else and letting a burden befall someone as a 
side effect of helping someone else, is not trivial. Many theorists assert that we are permitted to allow 
a greater burden to befall someone as a side effect of our actions than if that burden is a means to 
achieving our action. Consider the common example of a trolley threatening the life of many people. It 
is generally considered harder to justify pushing someone off a bridge in order to stop the trolley from 
killing many people than diverting a trolley onto side track where it will kill one other. If this 
distinction is justified, then Voorhoeve’s test does not track the cases we are interested in.17 The test 
may apply to cases where we must harm one group in order to benefit another. A fanciful example of 
this may be drawing a small amount of blood from the majority of the population in order to benefit a 
minority via transfusion. By contrast, the cases we are considering such as the World Cup Case do not 
involve using the fans as a means of benefiting Jones.  
 
17 This relates to a point raised by Halstead (2016). He worries that Voorhoeve’s test raises a problem 
for non-agential patients (e.g., non-human animals). One’s capacity to judge whether one has a duty 
relies on one’s status as a moral agent. If Voorhoeve’s test is limited to moral agents, then it leaves an 
odd asymmetry between moral agents and non-agents who still have the status of moral patients. In 
later developments of the test, Voorhoeve (2015) stipulates that preferences that one’s own claim be 
satisfied can be determined by the agent taking up the perspective of the patient facing the threat. 
However, the idea of taking up the perspective of a cow to determine whether it ought to prefer that 
another cow’s harm be averted stretches this idea beyond plausibility. 
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I conclude that Voorhoeve’s test to determine when relevance obtains is unsuccessful. But with no 
other tests for determining relevance on the radar, is this a problem for the Relevance View? Perhaps 
not. While determining when one set of claims is relevant to another is no easy task, our judgements at 
the extremes are clear enough. By way of example, the competing claims in the World Cup case are 
not relevant, while the claim against paraplegia is relevant to death. There are many problems in ethics 
where it is unclear where one consideration overtakes another and yet we do not feel that we need to 
design a test. For example, at what point does acting in a child’s best interests override their parents’ 
wishes? It does not seem that a simple test will help us decide the appropriate threshold. 
Voorhoeve’s test served the functions of both test and rationale. It attempts to give a way of 
determining when one set of claims is relevant to another. It also attempts to explain the Relevance 
View by showing that Pure Aggregation is appropriate in some cases, and Anti-Aggregation is 
appropriate in others. I have given up on the of these first functions but the equivalent of Voorhoeve’s 
second function remains important if the Relevance View is to stand its ground against Pure 
Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation. Pure-Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation have an underlying 
rationale, what about the Relevance View? 
2.7 Weak Aggregation 
The Relevance View is the position that when claims compete, we should aggregate only when these 
competing claims are relevant to each other. Relevance is determined by comparing the significance of 
individual competing claims, but the judgement of relevance is unlikely to be determined by some test. 
In this section, I defend another rationale for the Relevance View called Weak Aggregation (Walen 
forthcoming).  
2.7.1 What is Weak Aggregation? 
Earlier, I rejected the Threshold View in consequentialism because our judgements about welfare do 
not seem accommodating to sharp discontinuities in value. However, another kind of sharp 
discontinuity is present within the Relevance View as described up until this point. A weaker claim is 
either relevant to a stronger claim, in which case it has full aggregative strength, or it is not relevant, in 
which case no number of claims of the same strength can defeat the stronger claim. One might dislike 
this idea that weaker claims have full aggregative strength against a stronger claim up until a point, 
after which all this strength is lost. Unlike the case of receiving consent, where you either have it or 
you do not, duties in the context of competing claims do not seem accommodating of sharp boundaries 
of this sort. Alec Walen speculates that the Relevance View might be part of a larger, profoundly 
contextual picture of aggregation he calls Weak Aggregation: 
Weak aggregation treats Limited aggregation [i.e., the Relevance View] as the limit of a 
more general tendency for weaker claims to aggregate more and more weakly against 
stronger claims as the gap between them grows. That seems more plausible than the 
thought that there is a sharp line between those cases in which weak claims add up in the 
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balance at full strength and those cases in which the ability to meaningfully aggregate 
suddenly disappears. (Walen forthcoming, p.9)  
As a burden is dispersed among individuals, the claims that protect individuals against this burden get 
weaker. Suppose two people have competing claims to be free of four weeks of pain. Saving either 
claim seems permissible. Next, consider a case where one person has a claim to be free of four weeks 
of pain and their claim competes with two other people’s claim to each be free of two weeks of pain. 
In this case, Weak Aggregation implies we should satisfy the claim of the single person who faces four 
weeks of pain. Finally, consider a case where two people each have a claim to be free of two weeks of 
pain and their claims compete with four other people’s claims each to be free of one week of pain. 
Weak Aggregation implies we should satisfy the claims of the two individuals who each face two 
weeks of pain. 
We could keep dividing this burden of four weeks of pain equally among individuals and the 
combined claims that this burden would ground would aggregate more and more weakly against a 
claimant who bears the burden alone. Eventually, no number of the individually weaker claims could 
outweigh the burden that is fully concentrated on one person.18 
Weak Aggregation rejects transitivity between the strength of claims. Walen (forthcoming, p.12) 
illustrates this as follows. Suppose it takes ten weak claims to defeat one moderate claim, and ten 
moderate claims to defeat one strong claim. If aggregative strength were transitive, we would expect 
100 weak claims to defeat one strong claim. However, if Weak Aggregation is correct and the 
aggregative strength of claims is intransitive, then we could expect that it would take something closer 
to 1,000 weak claims to defeat one strong claim. Because of this intransitivity, there is no space where 
claims can be given a universal weighting. This contrasts with the original formulation of the 
Relevance View, where as long as claims are relevant to one another, they interact in a uniform way 
that reflects their strength. 
 
18 Temkin (2012, Chapter 3) discusses a related idea under what he calls Disperse Additional Burdens. 
However, Temkin seems committed to consequentialism and relatedly seems to be defining 
aggregation as a function determining the desirability of outcomes. 
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Figure 1   Weak Aggregation 
Figure 1.0 is a possible representation of the number of weaker claims required to outweigh a single 
claim against death. A new graph would have to be drawn if the stronger claim were something other 
than death. The strength of the weaker claim relative to the stronger claim is represented on the 
vertical scale. The number of weaker claims required to outweigh a stronger claim is represented on 
the horizontal scale. According to Weak Aggregation, as the claims get weaker, they diminish in their 
potential to outweigh the stronger claim until they can no longer do so. This can be represented as a 
curve that approaches an asymptote. As the strength of a claim approaches the asymptote, the number 
of these claims required to outweigh the stronger claim reaches infinity. However, above the 
asymptote, no number of weaker claims can outweigh the stronger claim. At this point, weaker claims 
can be regarded as no longer relevant to the stronger claim.19 
2.7.2 The Relevance Requirement 
Whereas Voorhoeve’s proposal was very much a hybrid between Pure Aggregation and Anti-
Aggregation, Weak Aggregation revises the Relevance View itself by developing within it a more 
complex account of the diminishing power of weaker claims to aggregate against stronger claims. 
It is not immediately clear where the disabling relation enters this picture. The idea of the disabling 
relation was a nice way of understanding why continuing with the broadcast in the World Cup case is 
wrong: the claims of the football fans are prevented from defeating Jones’s claim because the presence 
 
19 In many contexts, something like diminishing marginal utility is seen as a bug; in this context, 
diminishing marginal aggregative strength is a feature. In a related discussion of limited aggregation 
and risk, Lee-Stronach (2018) discusses the advantages of using bounded values to represent lexical 
priority over other approaches that use infinite values. 
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of Jones’s claim disables the aggregate force of these weaker claims. However, according to Weak 
Aggregation (and as indicated on the graph above), when a set of weaker claims compete with a much 
stronger claim, these weaker claims just lose their power to outweigh the stronger claim as they get 
weaker. One implication of this story about the diminishing power of weaker claims is that it does not 
seem that we need to make use of the disabling relation at all. The language we are using is just about 
weighing. However, the disabling relation could explain something absent rather than something 
present about how claims interact. It highlights the fact that even though weak claims might ground 
duties in some contexts, in contexts where they compete with much stronger claims, they do not 
behave in this way. When we say that the stronger claim disables any number of weaker claims from 
grounding a duty, this highlights the moral error in thinking that these weaker claims aggregate in a 
way that relevant claims would aggregate.20 
Rather than abandoning the idea of relevance altogether, I suggest we call the phenomena whereby 
one kind of claim cannot outweigh another kind of claim the ‘relevance requirement’. The claims of 
the football fans do not meet the relevance requirement, so they are unable to conjure up enough 
strength in the aggregate to defeat Jones’s claim. If we satisfy the claims of the fans we violate the 
relevance requirement. 
2.7.3 Weak Aggregation and solidarity 
Part of the rationale for Weak Aggregation is that it expresses a general tendency for claims to lose 
aggregative strength as the burden that grounds them is distributed. I think one reason that this 
tendency is morally important is that it expresses a kind of solidarity. As a burden is shared by more 
and more people, people should be more willing to bear the brunt of this burden: “It is not fair that you 
should have to bear the whole burden yourself. We will each take some weight off your shoulders 
even if the total burden now increases.” Eventually we say that nobody should have to bear a burden 
when other people can instead bear a relatively insignificant burden. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Let us conclude this chapter. The Relevance View is at home within deontological moral theory and is 
plausibly just one instance of the deeply contextual nature of that moral theory’s account of moral 
duties. However, sharp boundaries to do with facts about relevance are not supported by a Voorhoeve-
style test, and nor is it desirable to set any sharp relevance-irrelevance boundary. While the Relevance 
View does not tell a simple story about aggregation as its rivals Pure Aggregation and Anti-
 
20 The mistake we make when we assume that very weak claims can outweigh much stronger claims 
may be understood as a kind of “benefit fetishism” (Draper 2002, p.208). We forget that potential 
benefits belong to individuals and take their normative force from claims. Disrespect in this setting 
comes from violating the relevance requirement through expressing a kind of “benefit fetishism”.  
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Aggregation do, it does avoid certain unattractive implications of both these extreme views. I have 
also argued that the Relevance View has its own rationale which expresses the value of solidarity. 
The Relevance View is attractive because it reconciles two intuitions that pull in opposite directions. 
Our intuition in the World Cup case pulls us towards Anti-Aggregation and our intuition in the Life 
versus Paraplegia case pulls us towards Pure Aggregation. However, in virtue of reconciling these 
intuitions, the Relevance View opens itself up to criticism from both Pure Aggregation and Anti-




Sceptical Arguments Against the Relevance View 
The Relevance View diverges in character from both Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation and so 
is vulnerable to sceptical arguments from proponents of both views. Both Pure Aggregation and Anti-
Aggregation have a prima face simplicity that the Relevance View lacks: Pure Aggregation is the view 
that aggregation is always appropriate, Anti-Aggregation is the view that aggregation is never 
appropriate, and the Relevance View is the view that aggregation is sometimes appropriate. More 
specifically, the Relevance View states that aggregation is appropriate when and only when competing 
claims are relevant to each other (where relevance is determined by being close enough in strength). 
The simplicity of Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation is at least one pro tanto reason to favour 
them over the Relevance View. 
However, the Relevance View is built on the conviction that each of these views is unable to explain 
two important intuitions. I have elicited these respective intuitions using two hypothetical cases. From 
the World Cup case is the intuition that no number of claims weak claims can outweigh a much 
stronger claim. From the Life versus Paraplegia case is the intuition that some number of moderately 
strong claims can outweigh a very strong claim. One way for defenders of Pure Aggregation and Anti-
Aggregation to regain the upper hand is to show that our intuitions in one of these cases are unreliable. 
The motivating cases are supposed to elicit morally important intuitions, but if these intuitions are 
elicited by imagining the cases incorrectly or by morally irrelevant or misleading features of the cases, 
then we have little reason to take them seriously.21 
In §3.1 of this chapter, I defend the World Cup case intuition against various arguments that may be 
pressed by proponents of Pure Aggregation. In §3.2, I defend the Life versus Paraplegia case intuition 
against various arguments that may be pressed by proponents of Anti-Aggregation. Finally in §3.3, I 
will explore the possibility that the World Cup and Life versus Paraplegia intuitions are unlikely to be 
reconciled in the Relevance View because they rely on such different rationales. 
3.1 The World Cup intuition 
Here is Scanlon’s World Cup case again: 
Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a television station. 
Electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without turning off 
the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A World Cup match is in progress, watched by many 
people, and it will not be over for an hour. Jones’s injury will not get any worse if we 
wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely painful electrical 
 
21 Because I take it that Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation both gain support from the intuitions 
that they can elicit, I do not entertain general sceptical arguments about intuitions in ethics. I also set 
aside the particularist charge that intuitions in these cases do not generalise.  
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shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until the match is over? (Scanlon 1998, 
p.235). 
Pure Aggregation implies that there exists some number of fans for which it would be right to let the 
broadcast proceed at Jones’s expense. However, many share the strong contrary intuition that rescuing 
Jones is the right thing to do no matter how many football fans would be frustrated if we were instead 
to stop the broadcast. The World Cup case, then, seems to show that weaker claims do not always have 
the potential to outweigh competing stronger claims. I now explore four arguments that seek to 
establish that this intuition in the World Cup case is unreliable. 
3.1.1 What if the fans knew… 
The first objection to the World Cup case intuition is that it is not eliciting intuitions to do with 
competing claims at all. When we imagine the World Cup case, we imagine that the fans would share 
our knowledge about Jones. If the fans knew about Jones, then they would hardly be able to enjoy the 
match knowing that it came at such a high cost to someone else. We are consequently imagining that 
everyone (including the fans) has an interest in stopping the broadcast and saving Jones. This means 
that we are not thinking of the World Cup case as involving competing claims at all. 
This objection is question begging at best. Even if the fans did in fact know about Jones, their outrage 
could be because they recognise that their claims are not relevant to Jones’s claim. Indeed, if the fans 
knew about Jones, and they did not show outrage, I would think that their enjoyment of the football 
match would be in a sense inappropriate. It would be inappropriate to value watching the football 
match when one grasps that doing so comes at such a high cost to another person. The Relevance 
View helps explain why it is inappropriate to value watching the game at the expense of another’s 
suffering: what is at stake for the fans and what is at stake for Jones are poles apart.22 
3.1.2 Psychological biases 
The Relevance View is not supposed to appeal to special duties that come from intimacy with the 
person with the strongest claim. Our duty to save Jones is supposed to come from just the difference 
between what is at stake for the fans and what is at stake for Jones. If our intuition to save Jones were 
 
22 Cullity (2018) calls a related idea ‘content undermining’. Cullity gives the example of sadistic 
pleasure not being the kind of thing we have reason to promote. I am not saying that the fans’ pleasure 
in watching the game is in fact sadistic, but rather that if they knew about the situation then their 
pleasure would be tainted in a similar way that we think sadistic pleasure is tainted. This is different 
from the idea expressed by Voorhoeve (2014), discussed in the previous chapter, that any given fan’s 
preference that Jones’s claim be satisfied in a one-one competition is an apt test for relevance. As I 
noted, the threshold where one is morally required to prefer the satisfaction of another’s claim may be 
lower than the threshold an agent would tolerate when adjudicating between competing claims. This 
means that Voorhoeve’s test may act as a sufficient but not necessary condition for determining when 
one claim is not relevant to another.  
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being influenced by mere intimacy with Jones, then we would have good reason to discount the World 
Cup case intuition. 
Hirose (2015, p.49-50) suggests that certain psychological factors may bias us in favour of satisfying 
Jones’s claim. The first factor is that when we imagine the World Cup case, we might imagine being 
reasonably proximate to Jones. If we were instead in a room alongside a football fan on the other side 
of the world, we might feel less sympathy for Jones’s claim. The second factor is the ‘identified life’ 
effect. For example, we are much more likely to give to Oxfam if we are told a story about a particular 
child than if we are presented with a relevantly related mere statistic. In the World Cup case, we are 
acquainted with Jones and his situation, but the football fans are presented as an anonymous mass. If 
we were instead to know the identities of the football fans, or we were to know only that someone’s 
arm is trapped in electrical cabling, we might feel less empathy for Jones’s claim and more empathy 
for the fans’ claims. 
I think many people’s intuitions will remain unchanged even with these variations to control for our 
intimacy with Jones’s predicament. Moreover, our empathy for Jones in these cases may be reliably 
grasping just how much Jones has at stake compared to any given fan. 
Scanlon gives a more vivid illustration of a case that downplays our empathy for Jones: 
Suppose, for example, that we are deciding whether to build a new system of transmitting 
towers that will improve the quality of reception for many television viewers. It may be 
highly probable that in the course of this project a number of workers will suffer harms at 
least as great as Jones’s. Yet we do not think that it is therefore wrong to go ahead. 
(Scanlon 1998, p.236) 
This new case is analogous to the original case in that our decision to build the transmitting towers is 
justified by the minor benefits that it provides for a potentially great number of people but will come at 
the cost of one person suffering greatly. It is different from the original case in that we do not know 
who will suffer or even precisely when they will suffer. Even if you think that building these 
transmitting towers is still impermissible, this intuition will probably be less strong than the original 
intuition in the World Cup case. If this analogy has successfully neutralised our bias towards the 
person with the strongest claim, then perhaps this is a reason to discount our intuition in the World 
Cup case. 
However, Scanlon notes that this case “involve[s] failing to prevent accidental injuries rather than […] 
withholding aid from people who need it, in order to bring small benefits to others” (p.236). He also 
notes that “Our sense that it is permissible to undertake these projects also depends crucially on the 
assumption that precautions have been taken to make the work safe and that, in addition, workers have 
the choice of whether or not to undertake the risks involved” (p.236). I will say more about risk in the 
context of the Relevance View in Chapter 4 and 5. For now, I think this new case is sufficiently 
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different to the World Cup case and so it is not a more accurate illustration of the same case.23 I 
conclude that psychological biases of the kinds we have been considering are not obviously 
problematic in the World Cup case. 
3.1.3 Large number scepticism 
One well-rehearsed sceptical worry is that our judgements in cases such as Scanlon’s World Cup case 
are unreliable because we tend to have a poor imaginative ability to aggregate the claims of large 
numbers of stake-holders. Because we find it difficult to imagine the aggregate strength of millions of 
minor claims to watch the football match, we fail to conceive of our duty to leave Jones to suffer when 
the number of football fans is very large. 
However, the judgement that one claim is not a relevant consideration is independent of our grasp of 
large numbers (Voorhoeve 2014, pp.75-6). The judgement that some claims are not relevant to others 
is not based on trying and failing to imagine a number of very weak claims that can outweigh a 
stronger claim. Rather, our judgement is that very weak claims are not the kinds of things that 
outweigh much stronger claims. 
It is interesting to note that the sceptical worry being considered is also a popular move in population 
ethics. Total utilitarianism seems to entail the position that a large enough population where everyone 
has a life that is barely worth living is better than a smaller population where everyone has a life well 
worth living. This is known as the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit 1984). Some claim that this 
conclusion would not, in fact, strike us as repugnant if only we could grasp the aggregate happiness of 
all these people whose lives are barely worth living. But again, it is not clear that our judgement (of 
“repugnance” rather than disrespect in this case) comes from our inability to properly imagine 
aggregate happiness of this hypothetical large population. There may be other explanations such as our 
concern that future generations flourish and the Repugnant Conclusion is a setback to this concern. We 
care deeply about people’s quality of life and not just that they have a tolerable life. Total 
utilitarianism forces us to abandon this powerful intuition for the sake of theoretical simplicity.24 
 
23 Here is another adaptation that might be thought to reveal that our intuition to save Jones in the 
World Cup case is problematically biased. Suppose that we knew that stopping the broadcast would 
lead to violent protests on the streets or lead one frustrated viewer to commit a murder. The 
consequentialist would perhaps view leaving Jones to suffer as the lesser of two evils. However, 
deontologists are well equipped to handle these kinds of problems. Deontologists are used to tolerating 
inefficiency by making use of agent-relativity. Agents have certain constraints on how they can act 
which are (at least partially) resilient to greater harms coming as side-effects of their actions. The fact 
that a murder will take place as a side-effect of helping Jones is a bad thing no doubt, but this wrong is 
not the wrong of the agent who chooses to save Jones. Whilst the deontologist should not tolerate too 
much inefficiency (e.g., 1,000 predicted murders might be too many), the World Cup case intuition is 
fairly resilient to this line of objection. 
24 See Scheffler (2018) for an exploration of this idea.  
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The World Cup case intuition and the Repugnant Conclusion do not show that our imagination is 
deficient, but rather they highlight the need to imagine richer possibilities underlying our moral 
thought. This need is met through the notion of relevance in the first case, and may be met by 
examining a richer set of attitudes towards future generations in the second.25 
3.1.4 Reliability strategy 
The next objection I consider is that there is a certain practice that is reliable in the large majority of 
cases, but generates moral mistakes in ‘large number’ cases such as the World Cup case. For example: 
[W]hen faced with the opportunity to save one person from being killed, it is often safe to 
ignore minor harms to others on the grounds that it is normally impossible to establish 
that enough people will be saved from minor harms to justify refraining from saving a 
person’s life given epistemic and time constraints on decision-making. (Tadros 2019, 
p.176) 
This suggests that the judgement that certain considerations are not relevant could just be an artefact of 
efficient and generally safe moral decision making. 
Tadros responds to this objection by arguing that the reliability of excluding minor harms from 
deliberation does not vary between ‘small number’ and ‘large number’ cases, because this practice is 
insensitive to such numbers. It is instead sensitive to a certain sort of disrespect involved in thinking 
that very weak claims are the kinds of things that can establish duties in contexts where they compete 
with strong claims. Go back to the analogy with consent. We treat consent as a decisive consideration 
not because considerations of autonomy usually outweigh considerations of welfare. Rather, violating 
consent shows a distinct kind of disrespect that is independent of how much a patient has to gain from 
being operated on. 
This concludes the first major part of this chapter that investigates sceptical arguments against the 
World Cup case intuition. I have provided a response to each of these arguments. If, after a more 
comprehensive comparison between the merits of the Relevance View and Pure Aggregation, Pure 
Aggregation comes out on top, then we may have good reason to dismiss the World Cup case 
intuition. However, what I have shown is that the World Cup case intuition cannot be easily dismissed 
without a much wider-reaching analysis than I plan to entertain here. 
3.2 The Life versus Paraplegia intuition 
Of course, it is not only the proponents of Pure Aggregation that will resist the Relevance View; there 
is opposition from proponents of Anti-Aggregation as well. There are a number of instances where 
aggregation looks highly attractive. One extreme example is the choice between preventing one death, 
 
25 Draper (2002) has likened insistence in these cases on Pure Aggregation despite our intuitions to the 
contrary to a kind of “benefit fetishism”: showing more concern for maximising aggregate welfare 
than to the moral relationships between individuals. 
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and preventing 1,000 people from becoming paraplegic. It is highly intuitive here that we should serve 
the claims of the many individuals who each face a less significant harm than that faced by the worst 
placed individual. In this section I will investigate rationales for doubting the Life versus Paraplegia 
intuition. 
3.2.1 The real impact of certain harms 
The first argument I consider is that the Life versus Paraplegia case elicits the wrong intuition in a 
wide range of actual and possible cases of its type. One problem with the Life versus Paraplegia case 
is that it seems to assume that death and paraplegia affect all people the same way. In reality, paralysis 
may have a much larger impact on a champion runner than it would have on a person who works a 
desk job. For the champion runner, a major life-project is thwarted, and paraplegia may be as bad for 
them as death (or heaven forbid worse than death). Although the Life versus Paraplegia case invites us 
to imagine 1000 “very average” cases of paraplegia, it is difficult not to see this setting back people’s 
interests to vastly different degrees. When something as significant as paraplegia affects a large 
number of people, there is a reasonably high chance that this will affect someone as badly as death 
would. So, perhaps some claims against paraplegia are in fact as strong as the single claim against 
death. 
However, even if the two competing groups of claims contain claims of the same strength, we still 
need some way of determining which group’s claims to satisfy. I find flipping a coin to be deeply 
counter-intuitive in this setting; saving the many surely has more pull than this. But perhaps as long as 
a few people affected as badly as death, all that is needed to support a duty to save the many is a tie-
breaking argument. I expressed in the last chapter. I think tie-breaking is just a primitive kind of 
aggregation. It acknowledges that claims can cancel each other out and are in this sense 
commensurable with each other. Moreover, once we acknowledge claims are commensurable it is 
difficult to resist widening the scope of commensurable claims to claims that are only slightly worse 
than the strongest claim. So, even if we imagine that paraplegia affects some people as badly as death, 
the rationale for this judgement that we should help the many is still because the many outweigh the 
one.26 
 
26 Wallace (2019, pp.216-9) makes a more promising argument for saving the many without appealing 
to aggregation. When competing claims are of the same strength, it is in the ex ante interest of 
everyone that the larger group to be saved because any given person is most likely to be in that group. 
By choosing to aid the few, the agent disrespects not only those in the larger group but also those in 
the smaller group who also had an ex ante interest in the larger group being saved. Wallace makes an 
helpful analogy: suppose I break my promise to drop you off at the airport and coincidentally prevent 
your death because your would-be plane crashed after take-off; even though you cannot justifiably 
regret my not picking you up, you have still been disrespected by me. Likewise, even though those in 
the smaller group will regret the agent’s decision to help the larger group, the agent still disrespects 
them by not aiding the larger group. Notice that this justification is only available when all claims are 
of equal strength because otherwise the ex ante justification would be overridden by the consideration 
to save the person with the strongest claim. While I find Wallace’s argument from ex ante rules when 
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Life versus Paraplegia is designed to be a reductio of Anti-Aggregation, but there is no denying that it 
is sufficiently under-described to let other assumptions influence our judgements. One such 
assumption is that certain individuals will respond very badly to paraplegia. However, rather than 
pursue this line of thought further, I will now explore a different strategy for scepticism about what the 
Life versus Paraplegia case shows. 
3.2.2 Two domains of morality 
The Life versus Paraplegia case is an extreme example that even staunch proponents of Anti-
Aggregation should be moved by. However, there may be ways of accepting the intuition without 
accepting that any form of aggregation is the general upshot. After exploring examples that resemble 
Life versus Paraplegia, Wallace (2019) considers ways of making some concessions to interpersonal 
aggregation without giving up on his anti-aggregationist account. 
First, Wallace notes that cases such as Life versus Paraplegia strike him as particularly “bureaucratic 
or administrative” in nature: 
[T]hose bodies that are authorized to make such allocative decisions might naturally be 
understood to have special responsibilities, which they perhaps owe to the democratic 
populations on whose behalf they are acting, to see to it that public investments are made 
in ways that benefit as wide a population as possible. (Wallace 2019, p.228)  
Our duty to save the many in the Life versus Paraplegia case may come from duties specific to 
bureaucratic bodies. Taurek (1977) makes a similar point when he suggests that where patients have 
some collective ownership of a resource, saving the many could be justified by agreeing in advance 
that the resource should be used to save as many people as possible. Both these suggestions mean that 
certain agencies are subject to further constraints placed on them as a public body that give them 
duties to bring about optimific outcomes. 
However, Wallace rightly worries that these aggregative considerations may not be so easily 
demarcated to another domain of practical reason. There may be Life versus Paraplegia style cases 
that do not occur within the domain of a bureaucratic decision with a democratic mandate. He also 
considers the idea that once a certain threshold of aggregate welfare is reached, this may operate as an 
extra-moral input into practical deliberation. Wallace contrasts extra-moral considerations with 
interpersonal moral considerations that he takes to be distinctive of the anti-aggregative approach. 
Extra-moral seems to be a kind impersonal moral consideration; something valuable but somehow 
divorced from the relations between persons (perhaps something like beauty).27 When this pluralism of 
 
competing claims are of the same strength interesting, I remain convinced that there are situations 
where competing claims are clearly not of the same strength and yet we ought to save the many who 
have weaker claims than the few.  
27 Johnson (2019) proposes that a threshold can be justified by acknowledging that individuals have 
two kinds of claims and so does not appeal to impersonal value. In the current context, the first kind of 
claim is held by the person with strongest claim whereas the second kind of claim is held by all 
 32 
considerations—between anti-aggregative and aggregative considerations—is at play, Wallace 
suggests that these conflicts may not fully resolve themselves. So, even if we should and do serve the 
claims of the paraplegics, we have wronged the person who dies in some distinctly interpersonal way 
(Wallace 2019, pp.231-3). 
Wallace’s two suggestions may allow him to hold onto the dominance of anti-aggregative reasoning 
by making a concession in extreme cases, but they also have the fault of compromising on parsimony: 
we must accept two domains of practical reason, one interpersonal and the other either “bureaucratic” 
or “extra-moral”. The Relevance View is committed to just one domain where claims compete. 
Moreover, the very idea of splitting morality into more than one domain in order to exclude certain 
cases looks troublingly ad hoc. 
3.3 Hedging our bets  
Building on Wallace’s idea from the last section, Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation may just be 
two incompatible ways of looking at morality. Given moral uncertainty about which view is correct, 
we could play it safe by being guided by one or the other view in different situations (Temkin 2012, 
pp.39-45). 
Even if we have good reason to believe that Pure Aggregation is correct, as long as we have some 
reason to believe Anti-Aggregation is also correct, there are certain circumstances where we should let 
Anti-Aggregation guide us. For example, in the World Cup case, so long as the total number of fans is 
not too large, our bets should plausibly be guided by the following considerations. If Anti-Aggregation 
is true and yet we choose to satisfy the claims of the fans in the World Cup case, we act very wrongly, 
because the claims in question are so far apart from each other in strength. However, if Pure 
Aggregation is true, and yet we choose to serve Jones’s claim, we do not act very wrongly, because 
the aggregate of the claims of the fans is not that much stronger than Jones’s claim. So choosing to 
save Jones would hedge our bets: we are right if Anti-Aggregation is true, and we are not far wrong if 
Pure Aggregation is true. 
Where the verdicts of Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation come sharply apart, we might have 
most overall reason to decide as though the Relevance View is correct. The Relevance View would be 
a way of hedging our bets: it minimises the chances of our making decisions that are very wrong. 
While this pseudo-justification for the Relevance View might get proponents of Pure Aggregation and 
Anti-Aggregation to make some concessions, I think the justification of the Relevance View I outlined 
 
parties. This weaker second kind of claim can outweigh the first only in very large numbers. One 
problem with this proposal is that it implies the number of claims is a peripheral issue for deontology 
which I argued was a mistake in §2.5.2. 
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in the previous chapter is powerful enough to resist this alternative justification.28 The Relevance View 
should not be thought of as a hybrid between Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation (pace 
Voorhoeve 2014) but rather seen as the limit of Weak Aggregation. As a burden gets more and more 
distributed, the aggregation of claims that each part of the burden grounds becomes weaker. As I noted 
in §2.7.2, Weak Aggregation embodies the value of solidarity: ‘we will each take one lashing to 
prevent our friend from receiving ten’. 
The responses I have outlined in this section and the last are worthy of much more development than I 
can give them here. However, my aims are more modest than showing that these alternatives are false 
all things considered. I am trying to make the best case for the Relevance View, and the aim of this 
chapter is to show that the intuitions that motivate the view are more difficult to resist than some might 
think. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored a number of rationales for doubting the intuitions that motivate the 
Relevance View. In each case I have offered a response in defence of these intuitions. A more 
worrying challenge to the Relevance View is that by helping itself to both Pure Aggregation and Anti-
Aggregation, it has the theoretical support of neither. I explored the idea that Pure Aggregation and 
Anti-Aggregation are incompatible ways of resolving competing claims. However, this thesis is 
centrally concerned with making the best case for the Relevance View rather than fully responding to 
this irreconcilability. 
The Relevance View may be able to capture more of our intuitions than either Pure Aggregation or 
Anti-Aggregation can do alone, but by forging a middle way between these two extremes it faces a 
unique set of problems. The next two chapters explore how the Relevance View might behave in 
various real-world settings. The problems explored in Chapters 4 and Chapter 5 threaten to show that 
practical adherence to the Relevance View in different settings would make everyone worse off in 
counter-intuitive ways. Chapter 6 explores how the Relevance View can respond to choices that 
involve more than two homogenous groups competing for aid. Whereas the problems explored in 
Chapters 4 and 5 are solely inherited from the upshot of World Cup case type intuitions, the problems 
in Chapter 6 come from trying to reconcile the World Cup and Life versus Paraplegia intuitions. 
 
28 We could, of course, endorse both rationales. But this depends on whether or not one thinks there is 




Intrapersonal Aggregation and the Unity of Individuals 
In the previous chapter, I identified several sceptical arguments that could be levelled against the 
Relevance View on behalf of proponents of Pure Aggregation and proponents of Anti-Aggregation. In 
each case, I offered a reason to think our intuitions in the World Cup and the Life versus Paraplegia 
cases are reasonably reliable. However, one further potentially devastating line of argument against 
the Relevance View comes from the fact that acting in accordance with it would run counter to many 
of our practices. This chapter begins the second general task of this thesis which looks at how the 
Relevance View might behave in real-world settings. My general strategy is to restrict the scope of the 
Relevance View to avoid counter-intuitive results. For each such restriction, I will offer a rationale 
that it is not ad hoc. In this chapter, I make the first step towards minimising how revisionary the 
Relevance View would be by excluding its application to cases where acting in accordance with it 
would make everyone worse off in counter-intuitive ways. I justify this restriction on the grounds of 
the Unity of Individuals, the counterpart to the Separateness of Persons. 
The challenges in the previous chapter arose because the Relevance View resembles Pure Aggregation 
in some contexts and Anti-Aggregation in other contexts. The challenges in this chapter and the next 
are come from the part of the Relevance View that resembles Anti-Aggregation. These problems seem 
to arise from not giving equal marginal weight to each claim of a given strength. Therefore, taken 
together, many of these arguments may be seen as an additional reason to doubt the World Cup case 
intuition. 
In §4.1 I will show how intrapersonal aggregation interacts with a number of distributive justice 
decisions. In §4.2 I will argue that the Unity of Individuals explains why Relevance View would not 
apply when acting in accordance with it would make everyone worse off. In §4.3 and §4.4 I engage in 
an extended discussion of the Relevance View and risk. The Relevance View must tread a fine line 
between tolerating risk on the grounds of intrapersonal considerations and not tolerating so much risk 
as to undermine itself. These sections will also establish the assumptions for the discussion in Chapter 
5. 
4.1 Intrapersonal aggregation  
Take the following sample of policy decisions: 
• A government agency’s decision to fund one kind of treatment or drug over another. 
• A government agency’s decision to build a highway. 
• A Public health intervention such as a sugar tax. 
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Decisions of these kinds inevitably involve trade-offs between the interests of different people. More 
than that, these decisions often involve trading weak interests against much stronger interests. For 
example, a government agency may have a choice between funding paracetamol for mild pain relief 
and funding a lifesaving treatment for some rare disease. If paracetamol is much cheaper than a 
lifesaving treatment, then we can expect to benefit many more people by funding the former. 
However, claims to mild pain relief may not be relevant to claims to lifesaving treatment, and funding 
paracetamol here may violate the Relevance View. 
Another example of a public policy decision that seems to violate the Relevance View involves 
building a highway that will provide a benefit to many people, but will put the residents near the 
highway at higher risk of early death. For example, children from nearby may walk out onto the road 
and all local residents are victims to the detrimental effects of exhaust pollution on their health. The 
Relevance View might condemn building this highway if it involves genuine competing claims and 
the minor benefits that drivers can expect are not relevant to these major harms that may befall local 
residents. 
One consideration that seems to matter in both of these examples is whether or not the people whose 
claims are thwarted by acting one way are the same people whose claims are satisfied. The World Cup 
and the Life versus Paraplegia cases are set up as distinctly interpersonal trade-offs. If we satisfy the 
claims of one set of individuals, we frustrate the claims of another set of individuals. Interpersonal 
trade-offs can be contrasted with intrapersonal trade-offs. Intrapersonal trade-offs involve trading 
harms and benefits within a given individual’s life. Because individual lives exhibit a morally 
important unity, we do not usually view trade-offs within lives as involving different claimants. My 
decision to have a hip replacement now will thwart my short-term interests, for example, but will 
increase my quality of life in the coming years. It would be odd to view this as a trade-off between my 
current self and my future self, as akin to a trade-off between two different individuals. This odd 
approach is the error that is identified by the Separateness of Persons.  
Where an act or series of acts can make every individual better off than an alternative act or series of 
acts, this provides an independent justification for acting in this way. Moreover, as I will argue, this 
independent justification may be overriding. 
4.2 Iterated choices 
One reason that the treatment of minor ailments in a public healthcare system may be consistent with 
adherence to the Relevance View is to do with intrapersonal aggregation. If a choice occurs frequently 
enough, then it may be in everyone’s long-term interest to restrict the scope of the Relevance View. 
The following table is a simple illustration of how being guided by the Relevance View at each point 
in time can make everyone worse off than acting in a way that maximises every individual’s own 
welfare. In this case, there are four individuals, P1-P4, and four times where claims compete, t1-t4. 
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Suppose claims of strength two are not relevant to claims of strength five, and that at each time an 
agent can either satisfy the multiple claims of strength two or the single claim of strength five, but not 
both. For instance, at t1, the claims of P1-P3 are each of strength two and compete with the claim of 
P4 that is of strength five. If we apply the Relevance View to this decision, then we should satisfy 
P4’s claim. 
Table 1   An Iterated Choice 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 
t1 2 2  2 5 
t2 2 2 5 2 
t3 2 5 2 2 
t4 5 2 2 2 
Total when guided by Relevace View 
at each time 
5 5 5 5 
Total when guided by considerations 
of intrapersonal aggregation  
6 6 6 6 
 
By applying the Relevance View at each time, everyone has a claim of strength five satisfied. But this 
comes at the cost of three other times when a claim of strength two is thwarted. The aggregation of 
these thwarted claims is of strength six, which is greater than acting on the basis of the Relevance 
View at each time. 
Intrapersonal aggregation provides a justification for not acting in accordance with the Relevance 
View at each time.29 This means that the choice situations where the Relevance View does apply must 
be rare enough such that intrapersonal considerations do not dominate. This suggests the following 
restriction on the scope of the Relevance View: 
An agent should not be guided by the Relevance View when acting in accordance with it 
would make everyone worse off. 
The rationale for this restriction comes from the counterpart to the Separateness of Persons. People’s 
lives have a unity that makes intrapersonal trade-offs appropriate in a way that interpersonal trade-offs 
may not be appropriate. The Unity of Persons shows why the Relevance View would not apply in 
situations where acting in accordance with it would make everyone worse off in the long run.30   
4.3 Ex ante reasoning 
There is a more liberal sense in which strict adherence to the Relevance View seems to make everyone 
worse off: the Relevance View may run counter to everyone’s ex ante interests. Ex ante reasoning 
takes the temporally prior perspective. This can be illustrated using Table 1 again. Prior to any time at 
which claims compete, it is in each of P1–P4’s ex ante interest that the agent satisfies the set of 
 
29 See Temkin (2012) for a discussion of how intrapersonal aggregation faces similar obstacles.   
30 Because everyone would want the Relevance View to give way to pareto-optimality when these two 
views give conflicting verdicts, we could even assume that everyone would waive their claim at each 
particular instance if it meant that they would be better off in the long run. 
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weaker individual claims. Before we know who among P1–P4 will have which claim at t1, each 
person has a 1 in 4 chance of having a strength five claim (0.25*5 = 1.25) and a 3 in 4 chance of 
having a strength two claim (0.75*2 = 1.5). This means that each person has the most interest in the 
agent acting against the recommendation of the Relevance View at t1. Identical reasoning supports 
acting in everyone’s ex ante interest at each of t2-t4. 
4.3.1 Productive social risk 
Ex ante reasoning looks particularly attractive in certain settings. Take the following hypothetical 
case: 
One million children have contracted a virus. If the public health agency does nothing, all 
one million children will be ill for one week and then die. The public health agency can 
produce one of two vaccines that must be taken by all one million children to be effective. 
Vaccine 1 is certain to save the life of each child but will do nothing for their being ill for 
one week. 
Vaccine 2 will prevent each child from being ill for one week and save their life, apart 
from a 1 in 100,000 chance that it does nothing.31 
In this case, doing nothing is morally out of the question. Any plausible theory of distributive justice 
would agree with that. I would also argue that by modest assumptions about self-interest, it is in any 
given child’s self-interest to receive Vaccine 2 rather than Vaccine 1. Notice that we take risks of this 
nature all the time. When we take a walk to the shop, we incur a small risk of significant harm (such as 
being run down by a car) for the sake of a high chance of a relatively insignificant benefit (such as 
getting a chocolate bar). Living with extreme risk aversion is a sure recipe for living an impoverished 
life. 
If it is reasonable that each child would choose Vaccine 2 for themselves, then it is highly plausible 
that we as the agent should choose Vaccine 2 for them all. However, if one million children receive 
Vaccine 2, we can be almost certain that one child will die.32 A claim not to be ill for one week is 
plausibly much weaker than a claim against death. If claims against death are competing against 
claims against illness, then according to the Relevance View, a week of illness is not relevant to death, 
 
31 Adapted from Dougherty (2013) and Frick (2015). Frick (2015) defines Social Risk according to 
four criteria: “(1) The risky action or omission will affect a large number of individuals. Because of 
this, it is virtually certain that some people will end up being burdened by it. (2) The individual losses 
to those who are burdened (relative to the baseline of some available alternative) are considerably 
greater than the individual gains for those who are benefited. (3) The action-type in question is rare, or 
rarely affects the same people twice; as a result, we cannot assume that over time almost everyone will 
benefit from a principle that permits actions of this type to be performed. (4) The risky action or 
omission is intuitively permissible” (p.178-9). 
32 The chance that at least one child will die is 1 - (1/100,000) ^1,000,000 ≈ 1. Matters are slightly be 
complicated when we are not privy to a precise risk. See Rowe & Voorhoeve (2018) for a discussion 
of decision making under ‘severe uncertainty’.  
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and so we ought to satisfy the claim against death. This would require us to choose Vaccine 1 where 
everyone is ill but nobody dies. 
Of course, before an agent acts, she does not know who will die, but she can be quite certain that 
someone will die. Nonetheless, she can still deliberate on the basis of what she has good reason to 
believe will eventuate. This is to take the ex post perspective. The ex post perspective can be 
contrasted with the ex ante perspective. From the ex ante perspective, each child has an interest in 
Vaccine 2 that is full health discounted by a 1 in 100,000 chance of death. 
One way of respecting the Unity of Individuals is to take productive risks on their behalf as they 
would take for themselves. The ex ante perspective is the perspective each child takes when they 
choose Vaccine 2 for themselves, it also rationalises our choice to administer Vaccine 2 on their 
behalf. Evaluating moral choices on the basis of ex post claims would threaten the symmetry between 
the prudence associated with individuals taking risks and beneficence associated with taking risks on 
behalf of others. Taking the ex post perspective would instead mean that we should choose for all 
children differently from how we would choose for them each individually (Frick 2015). 
One of the reasons we should favour the ex ante perspective, in this particular case, has to do with 
intra-personal aggregation again. We can use a similar justification to limit the scope of the Relevance 
View as we did when it made everyone worse off. Instead of trading-off between claims of different 
individuals, we are here trading-off within the possible futures of the same individuals (Thompson 
2018). Part of respecting our Unity as Individuals is letting people run risks and taking certain risks on 
the part of others. Because the Relevance View is only concerned with inter-personal aggregation, it is 
not appropriate to apply the Relevance View in settings where taking a risk is in the interests of 
everyone. 
4.3.2 Does ex ante reasoning undermine the Relevance View? 
One issue with the justification offered at the end of the previous section is that it actually seems to 
undermine the Relevance View. We could reason that it is often in everyone’s ex ante interests to 
follow policies that maximise aggregate welfare rather than comply with the Relevance View. This is 
because we often do not know who will be unlucky enough to have very strong claims to aid in the 
future. Suppose that letting the broadcast continue in the World Cup case would lead to more 
aggregate welfare than saving Jones would. We could justify letting Jones suffer in the World Cup 
case by pointing out that this policy was in his own long-term self-interest (his self-interest behind the 
veil of ignorance, to use a popular image). It may be in our ex ante interest to risk an infinitesimal 
chance of finding oneself in Jones’s position rather than an almost certain chance of having one’s 
favourite sports match disrupted. 
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However, the foregoing would completely undermine the Relevance View and gets embarrassingly 
close to certain developments of utilitarianism.33 This kind of ex ante reasoning would also be 
devastating for deontology in general. To use another example, it may be in everyone’s ex ante interest 
to endorse a society that adopted a policy of killing an individual to harvest their organs where those 
organs could save more than one life. This would, after all, decrease everyone’s expected chances of 
an early death. However, such reasoning would completely undermine the deontological distinction 
between killing and letting die. In order to save the Relevance View I need to differentiate productive 
social risk from problematic ex ante rules. 
In order to restrict the reach of ex ante justifications, Frick (2015) argues that their use must pass the 
following test: 
Decomposition Test: If a rule or procedure can be decomposed into a sequence of distinct 
causal stages, each of which involves the voluntary action of some agent, then it is 
permissible to adopt and act on this rule or procedure only if the actions it requires at 
every stage are justifiable to each person at that time. (Frick 2015, p.205)  
Frick is writing in the context of contractualism, but his point generalises. The core idea is that ex ante 
justifications must be present at every stage of a procedure in order for it to be permissible. We cannot 
justify leaving Jones to suffer at the time of the incident merely because this rule maximises his long-
term ex ante interests. (Perhaps it is in Jones’s power to waive his claim to be saved, but this does not 
give him a duty to waive his claim.) Jones has a valid claim to being saved in the World Cup case at 
the time the case is set. What allows us to administer Vaccine 2 to the population of children is that it 
is in each of their ex ante interests at the time of action. There is no later point in time where 
individuals will have claims on us that we act otherwise. This is because by then it will be too late. 
After giving all children Vaccine 2 and identifying the children who will die, it is impossible to reverse 
this decision and give them all Vaccine 1.34 
The Relevance View protects us against having our comparatively strong claims defeated by the much 
weaker claims of others. This protection is the default. To assume otherwise would concede too much 
to the utilitarian. All that is needed to satisfactorily defend agents’ duties to take risks on behalf of 
patients without undermining the Relevance View is to say in certain circumstances that patients are 
not protected by this default: when an agent can act in everyone’s ex ante interest at each time, then 
the agent has a permission to act in this way. 
 
33 For example, the rule utilitarianism of Harsanyi discussed in Frick (2015, p.189) 
34 However, if it were possible to switch the vaccine at this time, then this choice may be morally 
different. Gordon-Solmon (2019) has recently disputed Frick’s decomposition test on the grounds that 
it cannot differentiate between decomposable acts and acts that look identical to these that are set up to 
make it impossible to decompose them. I recognise more work needs to be done in response to 
Gordon-Solmon’s work but developing such a response lies outside the scope of this thesis.  
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Walen (forthcoming, p.6) points out that “if we are to have our own lives to lead, we have to run our 
own risks; we cannot have our welfare automatically pooled for greater ex ante benefit”. Having one’s 
organs taken for the benefit of another person is a huge sacrifice and so unless we have agreed to this 
in advance, morality that respects our autonomy should not expect us to be committed to ex ante rules 
(Walen 2019, p.62). 
There is another Separateness of Persons justification for the move made in the previous paragraph. 
Our bad luck falls on us as individuals, not as some supra-individual deliberating behind the veil of 
ignorance. The decomposition test thus protects our unity as individuals by allowing others to take 
risks on our behalf without undermining the Relevance View. We can sometimes act in someone’s ex 
ante interest in the same way that they themselves would choose to act under normal circumstances, 
but this does not commit us to any far wider deployment of ex ante justification such as utilitarianism. 
(See Appendix A on an alternative strategy for defending the Relevance View without undermining 
individual autonomy. This strategy relies on differentiating between acts and conjunctions of acts). 
4.4 Two further problems with restricted ex ante reasoning 
I will now consider two further problems that will help refine the scope of the Relevance View in 
relation to ex ante reasoning. 
4.4.1 The problem of dependent risk 
In the social risk case we have been considering, everyone has an independent risk of having a fatal 
reaction to Vaccine 2. Otsuka (2015) gives a helpful analogy to the distinction between dependent and 
independent risk by asking us to imagine two different roulette wheel setups. First, imagine a giant 
roulette wheel that has one million slots over a city. Whichever slot the ball lands on will correspond 
to death of one particular person. In this case, the risk is dependent: my not getting hit by the roulette 
ball depends on someone else’s being hit by that ball. Call this case ‘whole-city roulette’. Compare 
this with a case in which each city dweller has their own roulette wheel over their head with a million 
slots and one ball. This time, even though the expected number of deaths is the same as in the previous 
case, my not getting hit by my ball has nothing to do with whether or not you get hit by your ball. Call 
this case ‘individual roulette’. 
In the vaccine case we have been considering, everyone has an independent risk of having a fatal 
reaction to the vaccine. All we know is that one’s susceptibility to this is 1 in 100,000; taking Vaccine 
2 is more like ‘individual roulette’ than ‘whole-city roulette’. However, consider a new set-up where 
Vaccine 2 is replaced with Vaccine 3: 
One million children have contracted a virus. If the public health agency does nothing, all 
one million children will be ill for one week and then die. The public health agency can 
produce one of two vaccines that must be taken by all one million children to be effective. 
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Vaccine 1 is certain to save the life of each child but will do nothing for their being ill for 
one week. 
Vaccine 3 is certain to save the life of each child and also to prevent them from being ill 
for one week. 
In this case we should choose Vaccine 3. It is identical to Vaccine 1, except that it also cures each 
child’s illness. However, suppose just before Vaccine 3 is administered, we realise there has been a 
dosing error: only 999,990 effective vaccines have been created, ten vaccines short. We can either 
insert 10 mock-vaccines at random into the batch and go ahead with administering Vaccine 3 or switch 
to administering Vaccine 1.35  
By administering Vaccine 3, everyone still has a 1 in 100,000 chance of dying, which is identical to 
the chance of dying if one receives Vaccine 2. However, this time, unlike the original case, the risks 
are dependent. That is to say that the likelihood of any particular child’s receiving the fully effective 
vaccine now depends on others receiving the fatal mock-vaccine. This was not the case in the original 
set-up: whether or not any particular child has a fatal reaction to Vaccine 2 does not depend on other 
people having this reaction. We may seek to put ourselves at ease by noting that risks of this nature are 
unlikely to occur. After all, I have taken quite some creative liberty in designing this case. But for the 
sake of theoretical completeness, I will try to say something more. 
This new case seems like the paradigmatic case of competing claims. Even though any single person’s 
risk of dying from the vaccine is the same as the previous case, if one child benefits when the vaccine 
is rolled out, their benefiting from the vaccine comes at the cost of another being harmed. 
(Alternatively, the chances of my being harmed are increased because somebody else is benefited). 
Even though from the ex ante perspective, Vaccine 2 and Vaccine 3 are identical, there seems 
something uncomfortably interpersonal present in Vaccine 3 that is not present in Vaccine 2. 
One potential difference between the dependent risk and independent risk cases is that when risk is 
independent, there is a chance that nobody will die and so we may wish to hedge our bets on this 
possibility actualising. However, this is a dead-end. Not only is it incredibly unlikely that nobody will 
die in the independent case, but there is also the chance that even more people will die in the 
independent case than in the dependent case. After all, over two coin-tosses, the chance of flipping no 
tails is the same as the chance of flipping two tails. 
Rather than say that the Relevance View should differentiate between Vaccine 2 and Vaccine 3, the 
difference between these vaccines may involve an independent consideration about fairness. Rowe 
(2019) thinks that cases of independent risk are importantly different from cases where one benefits at 
another’s expense.36 It is only when everybody’s ex post interests are independent that they do not 
 
35 See Ruger (2018) for a different set up that elicits a similar problem for contractualism. 
36 Rowe (2019, p.55-6 fn.20) admits that consent looks even more important in cases of dependent risk 
than in cases of independent risk. This might be worth exploring. On another note, Tadros (2019) 
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compete. One reason Rowe (2019, p.57) thinks that dependent risks are morally distinct is that 
“[g]aining at the expense of others is at odds with the value of solidarity”, which is “the desire for all 
to get something.” Whether the agent administers Vaccine 1 or Vaccine 3, the children’s “fate is tied 
together.” If Vaccine 1 is selected, then all children end up ill for one week. If Vaccine 3 is selected, 
there is an inevitable inequality of outcome. Contrast this with Vaccine 2 from the original case. In 
Vaccine 2, the inequality in outcome is resolved by the fact that everyone’s risk was independent; one 
child’s fate has nothing to do with the fate of the other children. 
The feature of dependent risk may make Vaccine 2 preferable to Vaccine 3, but this difference is not 
enough to make selecting Vaccine 3 impermissible all things considered. I think this for the following 
reason. Suppose that everyone will receive Vaccine 1 by default, but each individual can opt out and 
receive Vaccine 3 instead. It is reasonable for every individual alone to opt out in favour of Vaccine 3. 
By opting out of Vaccine 1, any given individual does not affect the prospects of any other individual, 
nor what it is reasonable for any other individual to choose. 
4.4.2 The problem of the identified life 
I will now consider a second worry with using the ex ante perspective in cases of involving risk. After 
defending the ex ante perspective in the context of Scanlon-style contractualism which is a kind of 
Anti-Aggregation, Frick (2015) identifies a mixed blessing from adopting this perspective. Consider 
the following case: 
Miners (1 vs. 100): Gareth, a miner, is trapped in a collapsed shaft. If we do not save him, 
he is virtually certain to die within days. However, a rescue will be costly. Suppose we 
must choose between the following two options: 
• Rescue: Spend all our available funds to rescue Gareth. 
• Prevention: Spend our available funds to improve safety at this mine, reducing 
the risk of future accidents. If we choose this option, the risk of death for each of 
the other 100 people working at this mine of dying in a future accident will be 
reduced from 3 percent to 1 percent. We expect that this will save two lives 
(though we cannot know whose). However, Gareth will die. (Frick 2015, p.215) 
Frick believes that the ex ante perspective in combination with Anti-Aggregation gives us decisive 
reason to rescue Gareth in this case. This is because whereas Gareth has a full claim against death, 
each of the other miners have weaker claims that is discounted to reflect the 2 percent decrease in this 
death eventuating. The Relevance View is not a form of Anti-Aggregation, but when one claim is not 
relevant to another, it behaves like an Anti-Aggregationist view. Suppose a full claim against death is 
not relevant to a 2 percent increase in the chance of death. Then it seems that we should satisfy 
 
writes about the importance of relevant alternatives. To illustrate this idea using the current cases: 
when Vaccine 1, 2, and 3 are all options, Vaccine 3 might be impermissible but not when just Vaccine 
1 and 3 are the only alternatives. 
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Gareth’s claim no matter how many miners are thereby disadvantaged by having to deal with a high 
chance of death (3% rather than 1%). 
The ex ante perspective in combination with the Relevance View seems to support favouring what 
Frick calls the ‘identified life’ over any number of ‘statistical lives’. On the one hand, some have 
thought that preference for the identified life is a feature of common-sense morality and this would 
seem to count in favour of the view. On the other hand, when the number of miners is increased, using 
ex ante reasoning becomes less plausible. Suppose that the alternative to saving Gareth is now to 
reduce the chances of death for 1000 miners from 3 percent to 1 percent. We could now expect to save 
20 statistical lives! Now saving Gareth rather than improving safety for 1000 miners should be much 
harder to justify. But ex ante reasoning in this case seems insensitive to the number of future deaths. 
This should strike the supporter of aggregation as deeply counter-intuitive. 
Frick argues that the solution to the problem of identified over statistical lives is making some further 
concessions to Pure Aggregation. However, this significantly compromises the aims of his own Anti-
Aggregation view and would do the same for the Relevance View. Instead I believe this problem can 
be solved by getting clear about the relationship between the Relevance View and ex ante reasoning.  
The ex ante justification only works when everyone’s claims are aligned. When claims compete, it 
makes more sense to use the ex post perspective (Walen forthcoming).37 To justify the transition from 
the ex ante perspective to the ex post perspective consider the concept of waiving one’s claim. There is 
an analogy between waiving your claim in a single-person case and waiving your claim in a case of 
social risk. If a patient consents to a surgery and the doctor takes reasonable precaution, the patient has 
no grounds for complaint if the surgery goes bad. By analogy, when we act in the ex ante interests of 
all one million children by giving them each Vaccine 2, it is reasonable to assume that each child will 
waive their ex post claim (Walen forthcoming). If a child dies, they have no complaint because we 
acted in each child’s ex ante interest. However, if a course of action is not in someone’s ex ante 
interest, we can hardly assume that they have waived their ex post claim. In the mining example, why 
would any of the 1000 miners waive their ex post claim against death just because another person 
(Gareth) faces a certainty of death? This might be a noble thing to do, but not something that can be 
reasonably assumed. The miners would only waive their ex post claim if we were acting in their ex 
ante interest. 
Someone could object that the analogy to the surgery case and the vaccine case is weak. The ex post 
claims of the children who die are problematic precisely because they are caught up in an interpersonal 
trade-off with the claims of all the other children who will merely suffer illness for a week. By 
contrast, there is nothing interpersonal about the surgery case; the patient’s interests alone are at stake. 
 
37 Several writers have developed hybrid risk models to make the Relevance View work across all 
cases involving risk (e.g., Lazar 2018; Suikkanen 2019). I agree with Walen that this is a general 
mistake in the literature on risk, but I will not engage with this line of argument here. 
 44 
Perhaps a better analogy then would be the risk we impose on each other by driving our cars. The state 
has an interest in stopping individuals harming each other (this is a relational claim we have against 
each other). But we think that it would be wrong for the state to ban driving just because some people 
will seriously harm others. We all waive our complaints against being injured by other drivers so that 
we can all enjoy the benefits of driving (of course we waive these complaints assuming that due care is 
shown by other drivers). 
I conclude that the ex ante justification does not support preference for the identified life. When ex 
ante interests compete we should revert to the ex post perspective for aggregating competing claims. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have identified two restrictions on the scope of the Relevance View that come from 
considerations about intra-personal aggregation. The Relevance View can respect the Unity of 
Individuals by not applying in situations where it would make everyone worse off. Intrapersonal 
considerations also justify productive social risk. Another reason that this is important is to respect 
people’s freedom to take individual risks. However, this does not justify the general adoption of ex 
ante rules. We can restrict the scope of application of ex ante reasoning using something like Frick’s 
decomposition test, according to which ex ante justifications must be available at every stage in the 
series of acts in question. 
In Appendix A I consider an alternative strategy for responding to worries about risk in relation to the 
Relevance View. I argue that this strategy is ultimately unsuccessful. In Appendix B I also consider 
somewhat tangential epistemic worries about ex ante justifications in situations involving risk. 
Still, even with the arguments I have made in this chapter that appeal to intra-personal aggregation, the 
instances in which intrapersonal aggregation kick in remain very rare. The chances of everyone in the 
population having a major claim to aid at least once in their life are low. Nor does productive social 
risk exhaust the instances where the Relevance View seems to rule that many of our practices are 
impermissible. In the next chapter, I aim to refine the scope of the Relevance View even more by 
acknowledging two additional factors that may be relevant in real-world settings. 
 45 
Chapter 5 
How Revisionary is the Relevance View? 
In the previous chapter, I argued for two domains that lie outside the scope of the Relevance View’s 
application. First, the Relevance View would not apply when it would make everyone worse off in the 
long run. Second, the Relevance View would not apply in cases where taking a social risk is in 
everyone’s ex ante interest at all times. Both of these cases are more appropriately understood as 
involving intrapersonal rather than interpersonal trade-offs. This distinction is grounded in the Unity 
of Individuals, the counterpart to the Separateness of Persons. Respecting the Unity of Individuals 
means prioritising trade-offs that make individual’s lives as a whole go better. This includes taking 
prudential gambles on their behalf; after all, excessive risk-aversion is a sure way to lead an 
impoverished life. However, even with these limitations to the scope of the Relevance View, there are 
still some settings where the Relevance View looks excessively revisionary. Of course, the mere fact 
that acting in accordance with the Relevance View runs counter to our practices might just mean that 
our practices are wrong. However, this might also be a reductio against the view, so in this chapter I 
aim to show some ways that supporters of the Relevance View can sleep easy with many of our 
practices. 
I first look at what the Relevance View would mean for setting priorities in healthcare settings. On the 
face of it, the Relevance View seems to endorse moving resources from the treatment of minor health 
burdens to major health burdens. I will look at some possible reasons why this may not be the case. 
Next I will look at what the Relevance View would mean for practices where one group imposes a risk 
on another group with the potential to cause individuals in that group significant burdens; the 
Relevance View seems to rule out such practices. I will argue that deontology has the resources to 
show why this is not the case. 
5.1 Priorities in healthcare settings 
 
Publicly funded health agencies provide health-related resources with limited budgets, so at some 
level, they must be engaging with competing claims situations. For example, most publicly funded 
healthcare agencies devote funding to the treatment of minor ailments such as broken fingers, as well 
as to more significant conditions such as heart failure. In theory, the funding for minor ailments could 
be redirected to the funding for major health burdens. Supposing that claims to have broken fingers 
fixed are not relevant to having one’s serious heart condition treated, the Relevance View would seem 
to require redirecting these resources. A related example is when government agencies purchase drugs 
with a limited budget. A decision to choose to fund antihistamines for hay fever, for example, when 
these funds could go towards expensive drugs for rare life-threatening diseases, looks as though it 
might violate the Relevance View. 
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In these examples, acting in accordance with the Relevance View seems to require huge restructuring 
of how we manage healthcare.38 Of course, there may be diminishing marginal returns by redirecting 
this funding; we will be able to increase aggregate well-being less and less as resources are 
transferred. However, the Relevance View is built on a rejection of total focus on efficiency when it 
comes to resolving competing claims. 
Would acting on the basis of the Relevance View mean that we have to stop fixing broken fingers and 
funding antihistamines? I think an affirmative answer could be a reductio against the Relevance View. 
Surely the fact that minor burdens are so numerous and often require minimal resources to ameliorate, 
justifies resourcing their treatment. I now explore ways that defenders of the Relevance View could 
avoid these implications. In §5.1.1 I will outline and appraise resources that I have already mentioned 
in the preceding chapters. In §5.1.2 I will outline and appraise new resources that defenders of the 
Relevance View could bring to bear on this worry. 
5.1.1 Defending the treatment of minor ailments: aforementioned resources 
I have already said two things that may limit the reach of the Relevance View in the settings outlined 
above. First, in §3.1.2, I considered an example where we are faced with the decision of whether or 
not to build a transmitting station where we know that a construction worker is likely to be injured at 
least as severely as Jones in the World Cup case. In response to this adaptation of the World Cup case, 
I mentioned that we should distinguish between failing to prevent foreseeable harms and withholding 
aid that would ameliorate these harms. If we fund a new anti-histamine before spring and in spring a 
few patients present with major health burdens that could be ameliorated with another drug, we may 
now have no means of purchasing this second drug and so this looks like a situation where we are 
merely failing to prevent foreseeable harms. Perhaps there is a morally important difference between 
failing to fully resource a certain treatment and refusing to offer this treatment.39 
The second factor that may limit the revisionary character of the Relevance View in public healthcare 
settings is intra-personal considerations of the sort noted in the previous chapter. The Relevance View 
plausibly does not apply when acting in accordance with it will make everyone worse off in the long 
run.  However, while treatment for health-related burdens is common, it is not so common that we can 
expect everyone’s long-term interests to be identical. Some individuals are just genuinely less lucky 
than others, and will be burdened in ways that other people will avoid. Therefore, I do not think that 
this factor will cover all of our bases. 
 
38 Of course, perhaps the Relevance View rationalises the fact that actual practices of our health 
system do actually embody a lot of prioritisation of attention to major health burdens over attention to 
minor ones. I will return to this idea in §5.1.2.  
39 I worry that this response endorses a kind of practical irrationality, where we can make it impossible 
for ourselves to act later in the right way. Still, I will not explore this line of thought further here.   
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Another complication with relying on intrapersonal considerations is that an agent making resource 
prioritisation and allocation decisions will often not know whether or not the adoption of a policy will 
make everyone worse off in the long run. On the one hand, an agent may act in accordance with the 
Relevance View at t1 not anticipating that a similar situation in that domain will occur at time t2, and 
so on. On the other hand, the agent may anticipate that the choice set-up at t1 will occur frequently 
enough such that they can act in accordance in everyone’s intra-personal interests, and what in fact 
happens is that the set-up at t1 never occurs again. With this uncertainty, the agent can be guided by 
what she has most reason to believe. If the agent has good reason to adopt a policy of responses and 
this policy turns out to be incorrect, then she still acts correctly in one sense. 
I have mixed feelings about how useful the two factors I have just mentioned will be for justifying 
policies for the treatment of minor ailments. In light of this, I will now explore two reasons to limit the 
scope of the Relevance View that are independent of the considerations just outlined. 
5.1.2 Defending the treatment of minor ailments: new resources 
Voorhoeve (2018) suggests that the Relevance View is less revisionary once we consider that minor 
ailments might be the first stages of significant harm. For example, “a cold, if untreated, can develop 
into a life-threatening lung infection” (p.154). One’s claim to have one’s cold treated would then need 
to reflect this much larger setback to health-related well-being. Lung infections, unlike mere common 
colds, may now be relevant to more significant harms. The same could be said of broken fingers. If 
left untreated, a broken finger may impact on one’s ability to engage in certain occupational and 
recreational activities in the future. This is not a matter of intrapersonal aggregation because we are 
not adding up potentially different claims over the period of one’s lifetime. Rather, this factor merely 
recognises that the true strength of a claim reflects the total impact of well-being across one’s lifetime 
and not merely the most immediate effects on one’s well-being. 
A second justification for treating minor ailments is that the treatment of minor ailments may not 
compete with the treatment of larger harms if the former are mandated on different grounds to the 
latter. Suppose, for example, that the chances of any given person holding a very significant claim to 
aid is rare enough, and the chances of any given person holding a minor claim to aid is common 
enough. Then individuals may prefer to gamble on not receiving aid when they have a significant 
claim, so that their minor claims are taken due care of. 
The preference outlined in the previous paragraph may be expressed in multiple ways. For example, J. 
Paul Kelleher (2014) suggests that autonomous preference is an independent consideration that 
publicly funded health agencies can be sensitive to: 
[If a government health agency] can make a good case that it is displaying enough 
benevolent concern for the lives and well-being of those it serves, it can then permissibly 
add a layer of policy aimed at satisfying individuals’ autonomous preferences for risk-
taking. (p.406) 
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By “benevolent concern”, Kelleher means acting in such a way as to satisfy the claims of those facing 
major harms. One problem with this solution is that “displaying enough benevolent concern” seems 
likely to be arbitrary. However, this might be more or less a matter of public deliberation.40 How much 
do we as a society want to give priority to satisfying the strongest claims? A deeper problem with this 
proposal is that the Relevance View is supposed to be consistent with our living autonomous lives. It 
is supposed to apply to situations that are rare enough that we would not be constantly burdened by it 
and have to frequently appeal to a different domain of reasons to violate it. 
Voorhoeve (2016) makes a more promising suggestion with regard to accommodating people’s 
preferences for risk-taking in healthcare settings. The public may be willing to contribute additional 
funding for healthcare that it would not otherwise provide had the healthcare sector distributed 
resources with strict adherence to the Relevance View. If that is so, it is incorrect to frame the 
resources that go into treating minor ailments as competing with the resources that are distributed in 
accordance with the Relevance View towards major health burdens. Should the public wish to make 
use of the efficiencies of a public health system to provide treatment of minor ailments, it may be 
prepared to put additional funds (in the form of paying more tax) towards the treatment of these minor 
ailments, rather than paying for these services out-of-pocket (Voorhoeve 2016, p.154).41 Voorhoeve’s 
suggestion provides a less arbitrary way to justify the resourcing of treatments for minor ailments 
because finding is essentially tied to different domains of health-related claims. 
Despite these justifications for side-stepping the Relevance View in public healthcare settings, 
Voorhoeve (2018) cites the 1990 Oregon healthcare rationing exercise as an example where public 
sentiments seem to have actually aligned with the Relevance View: 
Infamously, on grounds of cost-effectiveness, officials recommended that tooth capping 
should take precedence over treatment for terminal appendicitis (Ubel et al., 1996). This 
proposal generated public outrage, precisely as one would predict if people’s moral 
sentiments conformed to ARC [the Relevance View]. (Voorhoeve 2018, p.154) 
Voorhoeve notes that in this case, the main beneficiaries (low-income individuals) were not the 
primary funders (state and federal government) and so the justification for the treatment of minor 
ailments due to funding by self-interested parties was not available. Therefore, this healthcare system 
is arbitrating between genuine competing claims to aid. 
I conclude this section by restating two additional reasons that the Relevance View might not run 
against the practice of attending to minor ailments in the healthcare system. First, minor ailments 
 
40 See Herlitz (2018) for one such proposal that builds on the ideas of Chang (2013) who suggests that 
when ‘given’ reasons run out, societies can create their own reasons. 
41 Taurek (1977) makes a related point based on collective ownership with regards to Anti-
Aggregation: where the patients have some collective ownership of a resource, saving the many could 
be justified by agreeing in advance that the resource should be used to save as many people as 
possible.  
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evolve into more serious conditions if left untreated. Second, claims to the treatment of minor ailments 
may not compete with claims to the treatment of major conditions, if the former are mandated on 
different grounds to the latter. 
5.2 Competing claims and risk 
In the previous chapter, I argued that when all claimants have the same ex ante interests at a time, then 
this can be seen as within the domain of intrapersonal aggregation and so lies outside of the scope of 
the Relevance View. In social risk cases, we can choose for all as we would choose for them each 
individually (Frick 2015). Rather than this generating an inter-personal trade-off, we are in effect 
instead making a self-interested gamble on the possible futures of the same individuals (Thompson 
2018). I also argued that when the ex ante interests of members of different groups conflict, we should 
aggregate on the basis of ex post claims (Walen forthcoming). This avoids awkward situations where 
ex ante reasoning seems to lead us to saving an identified life over any number of statistical lives (see 
§4.4.2). However, there are various practices where the ex ante interests of members of different 
groups conflict and aggregating on the basis of ex post claims would seem to lead to equally troubling 
results. I outline the problem in §5.2.1. In §5.2.2 I offer a solution. 
5.2.1 A problem for competing claims that involve risk 
Consider again Scanlon’s adaptation of the World Cup case: 
Suppose, for example, that we are deciding whether to build a new system of transmitting 
towers that will improve the quality of reception for many television viewers. It may be 
highly probable that in the course of this project a number of workers will suffer harms at 
least as great as Jones’s. Yet we do not think that it is therefore wrong to go ahead. 
(Scanlon 1998, p.236) 
In this adapted case, the ex ante interests of the television viewers conflict with the interests of the 
workers. Because it is not in the interest of any given worker to waive their ex post claim, and the 
viewers’ claims are not relevant to these claims, it is plausible that we should not allow the 
transmitting towers to be built. However, as Scanlon suggests, so long as reasonable precautions are 
taken, the workers’ informed consent seems decisive in this matter. By consenting to this project, each 
worker is essentially waiving their ex post claim. 
However, situations with this structure come up in the real world where it is not reasonable to assume 
that we have the consent of those exposed to risk, nor would attaining their consent be viable. 
Consider the practice of convenience driving (Walen forthcoming); that is, driving that has no wider 
social importance other than it is convenient for those who engage in it. Individual convenience 
drivers, in one trip or even over the course of their lives, impose infinitesimal risks of very significant 
harms on people who choose not to engage in this practice; for ease let us call them pedestrians (It is 
important that convenience drivers and pedestrians are not the same people, otherwise this would 
simply be a case for intrapersonal aggregation.) We know pedestrians die every year, and at least some 
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of those pedestrian deaths are due to convenience driving. Therefore, pedestrians would have an 
interest in banning the practice of convenience driving. Because the ex ante interests of individual 
convenience drivers and individual pedestrians conflict, we should aggregate on the basis of their ex 
post claims (Walen forthcoming). Plausibly, the claims of convenience drivers are much weaker than 
the ex post claims against severe driving-related injury or death, and the Relevance View would rule in 
favour of pedestrians.42 
However, banning convenience driving for the sake of a few pedestrians seems counter-intuitive. One 
reason this is counter-intuitive is because if there were only one pedestrian it is not reasonable to 
assume that they have a full ex post claim against death. If their existed only a single pedestrian in the 
population, their ex post claim should surely reflect the fact that that they are very unlikely to actually 
die. It still would not be in this person’s ex ante interest to waive their ex post claim but this 
discounted ex post claim may be relevant to the claims of individual convenience drivers in which case 
it can be outweighed. It is the mere fact that there are enough pedestrians to generate one undiscounted 
ex post claim against death that means the Relevance View seems to ban this practice. Even if you do 
not find this result troubling, consider another case such as eating peanuts.43 It would be strange if 
there should be a general prohibition on the consumption of peanuts just because it is more than likely 
that someone with a severe peanut allergy will die from accidental exposure. Again, this is not to say 
that reasonable precautions regarding their consumption should not be taken. It is plausible that 
restaurants should still make an effort to give people with peanut allergies reliable information and 
handle their allergy with care. But banning the consumption of peanuts just because across an entire 
population we can expect one peanut-related death is deeply counter-intuitive. I will now show why 
the Relevance View may not necessarily condemn such practices as convenience driving and the 
consumption of peanuts. 
5.2.2 Differentiating between acts and conjunctions of acts 
Tenenbaum discusses a similar set of problems currently facing the Relevance View in the criminal 
justice domain: 
A system of criminal punishment will over time almost certainly condemn some innocent 
people. Still, it seems plausible to say that despite the serious harm the justice system will 
 
42 The ex post claims of pedestrians may be even stronger along another dimension: by allowing 
convenience driving, the transport agency is imposing risk on pedestrians in order to benefit 
convenience drivers (Walen forthcoming). They are harming in order to benefit rather than the harm 
coming as a side-effect of benefiting convenience drivers. It is a common deontological conviction 
that this is harder to justify and one reason this may be the case is that we have stronger claims against 
being harmed as a means rather than as a side-effect. 
43 Ashford (2003) uses Scanlon’s example of air travel: there is a small chance that an airplane will fall 
out of the sky and kill someone on a remote island who does not benefit from air travel. Ashford 
expresses this particular problem with risk as a demandingness problem: giving up air travel would be 
too demanding on us. Ironically, there is a real-world problem frighteningly close to Scanlon’s 
example which does seem objectionable: the disproportionate effects that airplane emissions have on 
people being displaced due to sea-level rise. 
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cause to certain people, there is no general deontological prohibition against a system of 
criminal punishment. However, things would be different if the risk were concentrated in 
one person and in one action. We would not replace our system with one such that we 
would punish Jane who is (almost certainly) innocent but that would somehow allow us 
to reduce the number of people who are wrongly condemned overall. (Tenenbaum 2017, 
p.700) 
We can accept a general deontological prohibition against imprisoning innocent people. Still, we 
would not take this to prohibit locking anyone away when we are not absolutely certain of their 
committing the crime. Of course, an agency may legitimately take it upon itself to minimise the 
number of innocent convictions. However, what seems to matter is that each sentence be justifiable to 
each convicted person. While it makes sense to look at the permissibility of the set of these acts as a 
whole, it is also meaningful to view them as individual acts. It is easy to view this argument in terms 
of mathematical probabilities. If a reasonably reliable judge passes a guilty verdict with 99% 
confidence, after 100 such verdicts, we can reasonably expect her to have judged at least one case 
wrong. But Tenenbaum (2017) wants to say that the judge may be fully justified in every verdict she 
passes, and we can still say that the criminal justice system may have certain unjustified features. As 
Tenenbaum puts it, “the deontic status of a pattern of activity might not supervene on its constituent 
acts” (p.706). 
We can make a similar case for convenience driving (and peanut consumption). Once convenience 
driving is understood as a series of individual acts rather than a single complex act, pedestrians’ ex 
post claims no longer combine into a full ex post claim against being killed. This means that the ex 
post claims of pedestrians may now be relevant to the claims of convenience drivers because each 
individual’s ex post claim should reflect the low probability of severe injury resulting. It is plausible 
that these claims are now relevant to each other. 
This discussion makes sense of a much simpler idea in deontology. In the context of imposing risk of 
death, Tenenbaum (2017, p.684) writes that “[i]t seems perfectly coherent to say that it is disrespectful 
to seriously endanger someone’s life, but that we do not owe it to him or her to guarantee his or her 
safety”. It is sometimes inappropriate to view the conjunction of convenience drivers as a single agent, 
and to view this single agent as imposing a risk on pedestrians that is equivalent to seriously 
endangering them (given that some of them are likely to die). This means that while we can still set 
policy goals to reduce the harm that convenience drivers impose on pedestrians, the Relevance View 
does not rule out this activity on the grounds that a full ex post claim can be conjured together.44 The 
correct scope of competing claims is between individual actors rather than between groups. 
 
44 There may also be a place for compensation in this debate. Firstly, claims may give rise to 
secondary duties of compensation. This applies generally for satisfying competing claims. If Doctor 
Debbie provides Barb and Claire with the medicine rather than Anne, for example, perhaps Debbie or 
Barb and Claire owe it to Anne that she be benefited in another way. In the context of risk, people may 
be willing to waive their ex post claims if a reasonable compensation policy is implemented. For 
example, pedestrians may be willing to waive their ex post claims if they are generously compensated 
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5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have aimed to highlight some ways that the Relevance View might be less 
revisionary to our current practices and policies than it initially seems. In healthcare settings, as well 
as highlighting some of the resources I had mentioned in previous chapter I brought further resources 
to bear on this problem. I argued that properly acknowledging the impact of harms on one’s life as 
whole may justify the treatment of minor ailments. I also argued that the healthcare system may be 
accommodating people’s preferences for risk in numerous ways. 
In the second half of this chapter, I offered a rationale for defending certain practices where one group 
impose small chances of significant burdens on another group. Although we should use the ex post 
model when different groups’ interests compete, we should not arbitrarily group people’s ex post 
claims together. Sometimes certain policies are better thought of as arbitrating between individual 
actors, rather than between big groups. 
The discussion in the next chapter adds an additional layer of complication to prioritisation in 
healthcare settings. Agencies making rationing decisions are often faced with a spectrum of claims of 
different strength. This raises the question of how the Relevance View can accommodate three-way 
choices and choices involving competing non-homogenous sets of claims. 
 
 
should they be severely injured. We could actually view such a compensation policy as reducing 
pedestrians’ ex post claims. One would have less of a complaint if one suffered serious bodily injury if 
one were given generous monetary or healthcare compensation. Of course, there are limits to this 
reasoning. We may not be able, even partially, to compensate for the loss of certain goods. Along 
these lines, for example, it is not clear how one could compensate for someone’s death.  
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Chapter 6 
Developing the Relevance View 
In the real world, a single policy decision will affect different groups of people in different ways. In 
this chapter, I move beyond cases that resemble the World Cup and Life versus Paraplegia cases. We 
can call both of these one-many cases. In the World Cup case, one strong claim to aid competes with 
many very weak claims. In the Life versus Paraplegia case, one strong claim competes with many 
moderate claims. What was said in the one-many cases would also hold for many-many cases. If 
Jones’s colleague too had an arm trapped in the electrical cabling, then because one strong claim is 
enough to outweigh the claims of the fans, two strong claims will also be enough. On the other hand, if 
a larger number of people’s lives are threatened, then because claims against paraplegia are relevant to 
claims against death, we might expect this larger number of claims against death to outweigh the 1,000 
claims against paraplegia. What remains distinctive about these cases is that (1) the competing sets of 
claims are homogenous, and (2) there are just two competing sets of claims. 
In many settings involving competing claims, (1) and (2) are unlikely to obtain. For example, in the 
provision of publicly funded healthcare resources, many different types of claims compete for the 
same limited funding. I begin this chapter by introducing three-way choices, where it is not clear how 
the Relevance View guides us to choose. I show that the problem of such three-way choices has other 
analogies in ethics. Nonetheless, it is not clear how these problems should be resolved. One way to 
generate potential resolutions to these problems is to find general principles that are intuitively 
plausible in other situations and have promise here too. 
The second part of this chapter involves looking at two-way choices that involve heterogeneous 
claims. There has been some progress towards meeting challenges of this sort which I will outline in 
§6.2. However, rather than try to develop these solutions further, I suggest an alternative solution that 
involves limiting the ambitions of the Relevance View. 
6.1 Three-way choices and transitivity 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced two kinds of defeating relations. The first is the outweighing relation. For 
example, the 1,000 claims against paraplegia outweigh the single claim against death. The second is 
the disabling relation. This obtains when a sufficiently strong claim prevents a set of weaker claims 
from grounding a duty. For example, Jones’s claim disables the claims of the football fans from 
outweighing it. 
To introduce the next set of problems, I will use some shorthand. I will be comparing weak, moderate 
and strong claims. The kind of claim will be shown in parentheses, ( ). The number of people with this 
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claim will be shown using the number in front of the parentheses. A bar “|” will be used to signal that 
the respective claims are in competition (that is, they cannot be jointly served). I will “bold” the set of 
claims that the development of the Relevance View that I am entertaining tells us to satisfy. The cases 
I introduce might be thought of as analogous to situations where a healthcare agency must decide 
which kinds of harms to invest limited funds in preventing. In the following cases I just stipulate how 
many claims are sufficient to outweigh another claim and which claims are relevant to each other. This 
is simply to illustrate certain problems. 
First, consider a case involving an outweighing relation: 
1(strong) | 20(moderate) 
In this case, the agent can either serve the single strong claim or 20 moderate claims. Suppose that 
moderate claims are relevant to strong claims, and that 20 moderate claims is sufficient to outweigh 
the single strong claim. Therefore, according to the Relevance View, we should satisfy the 20 
moderate claims. Consider another case involving an outweighing relation: 
20(moderate) | 1,000,000(weak) 
In this case, the weak claims are relevant to the moderate claims. The 1,000,000 weak claims are also 
sufficient to outweigh the 20 moderate claims. Therefore, we should satisfy the group of weak claims. 
Finally, consider the following case involving the disabling relation: 
1,000,000(weak) | 1(strong) 
In this case, the agent can either satisfy the single strong claim or the 1,000,000 weak claims. By 
stipulation, weak claims are not relevant to strong claims, so we are required to satisfy the strong 
claim. 
The Relevance View raises some interesting questions about transitivity. Consider the following 
choice where we can only save one of the three groups: 
1(strong) | 1,000(moderate) | 1,000,000(weak) 
Here is a situation where it looks like the moderate claims defeat the strong claim, the weak claims 
defeat the moderate claims, and the strong claim defeats the weak claims. On the face of it, the 
relations among these competing claims seem to violate transitivity because it implies that what is true 
of the relation between A and B, and B and C, is not true of the relation between A and C. If this did 
violate transitivity one worry would be that it looks like whichever option we choose, we might have 
acted wrongly (Parfit 2011, p.203). For example, if we satisfy the strongest claim, we have acted 
wrongly because the moderate claims outweigh this claim. However, the relations between these items 
do not necessarily violate transitivity once we probe the Relevance View some more. 
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6.1.1 Temkin on transitivity 
Temkin (2012, pp.195-7) discusses the transitivity of the “permissibility” relation explored by Frances 
Kamm.45 It may be permissible for me to go to a movie rather than incur a significant risk to save a 
stranger’s life. It may be permissible for me to save a stranger’s life rather than keep a promise I had 
made earlier. And yet, it would be impermissible for me to go to a movie rather than keep a promise. 
The supposed intransitivity disappears when all three options are available because going to the movie 
is no longer an option. The permission to go to the movie only holds in the case where I have not made 
the promise. One similarity that we might observe is that we should only satisfy the weak claims when 
they do not compete with a strong claim. Because weak claims do compete with strong claims in the 
three-way choice above, these weak claims should be eliminated from the competition. However, 
opting for this response would be too fast, as there are other ways of specifying the Relevance View. 
Temkin (2012) discusses an example concerning affirmative action policies in job hiring settings, 
which has striking similarities to the above three-way competing claims set-up. Suppose that an 
employer ought to offer the job to the candidate with the highest credentials. However, there is an 
exception to this rule. Owing to the historical relationship between African Americans and White 
Americans, when an African American’s credentials are close enough to those of a White American, 
the employer ought to give the job to the African American.46 Now suppose that three candidates 
apply for a job and can be ranked in terms of their credentials in the following order: White American, 
Mexican American, African American. Given the choice between the White American and the 
Mexican American, the employer ought to offer the job to the White American. Given the choice 
between the Mexican American and the African American, the employer ought to offer the job to the 
Mexican American. Given the choice between the White American and the African American, the 
employer ought to offer the job to the African American. However, when considering the three options 
together, it is not immediately clear what the employer should do: 
[I]f we decide that the correct policy of affirmative action “merely” generates the 
conclusion that it would always be wrong to have a white occupy a position for which a 
sufficiently qualified African American applied, then […] we ought to hire Mexican 
American. However, we may decide that the correct policy of affirmative action “merely” 
tells us to rank all candidates in terms of their job-related characteristics and then choose 
the top one, unless the top one is White, and the second one is a sufficiently qualified 
African American, in which case choose the second one. This view would support [hiring 
the] White. Finally, we might decide that the correct policy of affirmative action tells us 
 
45 When Kamm (2007, p.298) talks about the Relevance View she does so in the language of respect 
and therefore as an implication of the Relevance View concludes that “disrespectful to consider” is not 
transitive. However, Temkin (2012, p.196) notes that a set of relations does not really violate 
transitivity when the features that lead us to choose A over B and B over C are not the same features 
that lead us to choose A over C. This is the case in our example, where two kinds of defeating 
relations are at work: outweighing and disabling.  
46 Of course, including only these two factors are intentionally very narrow. Temkin does not take a 
position on affirmative action policy itself, he just points out that this example has a relevantly similar 
structure to the Relevance View. For example, diversity in the workplace surely also counts towards 
why we might choose a candidate of one social group over another.  
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to rank all candidates in terms of their job-related characteristics and then choose the top 
one, unless the top one is white, in which case we should hire the top-ranked African 
American candidate, as long as he is sufficiently qualified relative to the top-ranked 
white. This would support [hiring the] African American. (Temkin 2012, p.200) 
Notice that the problem only occurs because the affirmative action policy is crucially underspecified. I 
will not try to specify the correct affirmative action policy, but I will lay out the respective options for 
the Relevance View as Temkin does in the job hiring case.  
We might decide that whenever there is a set of claims that is not relevant to another set of claims in a 
competition, we should eliminate this first set of claims, and settle the remaining competition by 
seeing which set of claims is stronger.47 In our example, because the strong claim disables the weak 
claims, we can immediately eliminate the weak claims from the choice set. By stipulation, in the two-
way choice between satisfying a strong claim or 20 moderate claims, we should satisfy the moderate 
claims. Therefore, according to this justification, we should satisfy the moderate claims. 
Alternatively, we might decide that when one set of claims is relevant to another set of claims in the 
choice set, the disabling defeater is neutralised, and we can decide on the basis of the weighing 
relation.48 In our example, because the moderate claims outweigh the strong claim, and because the 
weak claims outweigh the moderate claims, we should satisfy the weak claims. 
The final alternative might simply have us defeat in favour of the strongest claim.49 In our example, 
we can defeat in favour of the strong claim using the following procedure: the weak claims outweigh 
the moderate claims, and the strong claim disables the weak claims, so we have a justification for 
satisfying the single strong claim. 
Rather than privileging one of these options, one could settle on the position that these options are 
equally good, or on par, and the only rule governing our choice is that we save one group (Temkin 
2012, p.201). However, another way to settle which option is most promising is by looking at complex 
 
47 Voorhoeve (2014) argues for this solution.  
48 Tadros (2019) supports this solution but suggests that other resources in deontology complicate this 
picture. For any option to win the competition, it must rely on a second option to defeat the third 
option. For example, if we have a duty to satisfy the weak claims, then this is because the moderate 
claims outweigh the strongest claim. But Tadros suggests that this introduces a morally important 
consideration: the people with moderate claim may need to be strengthened to reflect the fact that they 
are being used to benefit the weaker claimants. 
49 This option might be supported by the suggestion due to Van Gils and Tomlin (forthcoming) that 
one could treat the defeating process as always defeating in favour of the strongest claim. Van 
Gils and Tomlin suggest a procedure which tells us that when there are many ways one could 
match claims overall, we should match in favour of the overall strongest claim (pp.31-3). They 
call this procedure “strongest decides”. However, they reject this procedure because it could lead 
to results whereby the addition of a claim to the competition could actually prevent the group 
with which this additional claim is aligned with from having its claims satisfied. (Illustrating this 
here would take up too much space.)  
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two-way choices. We can eliminate certain options if they generate counter-intuitive results in certain 
set-ups. I will explore this strategy now. 
6.2 Complex two-way choice cases 
The previous section puts us in a position to begin investigating how the Relevance View can guide us 
in complex two-way choices, using cases which involve potential outweighing and disabling relations. 
Patrick Tomlin (2017) identified a strange implication of the Relevance View when it comes to certain 
types of these cases: the group of claims that one ought to serve switches in counter-intuitive ways 
when other claims are added to the competition. Using my shorthand method again, I will “underline” 
claims below to show that they have been added to the competition. Take first the view called “Anchor 
by Competition”, which tells us to eliminate claims that are not relevant to at least one of the claims 
with which they compete (Horton 2018). While this might initially seem sensible, it leads to strange 
results. Suppose that in the following case we are required to serve the claims on the right-hand-side 
(RHS): 
(A) 1(strong) | 20(moderate) 
Observe what would happen if weak claims are added to the competition in the following way: 
(B) 1(strong) + 1(weak) | 20(moderate) + 1 billion(weak) 
Even though many more weak claims were added to the RHS than to the left-hand-side (LHS), the 
single weak claim added to the LHS was enough to tip the balance in favour of the LHS. This is 
because, whereas the weak claim added to the LHS is relevant to the moderate claims with which it 
competes, the weak claims added to the RHS are not relevant to the strong claim with which they 
compete. This means that the billion weak claims are disabled and the single weak claim is not. This 
counter-intuitive switch is enough to reject Anchor by Competition.50  
A different view is “Anchor by Strength”, which tells us to eliminate claims that are not relevant to at 
least one claim in the competition. In case (B) above, the weak claims added to both sides would be 
eliminated because neither of them is relevant to the strong claim in the competition. Therefore, we 
should choose in (B) as we would choose in (A). However, Anchor by Strength leads to another kind 
of counter-intuitive switch: 
(C) 4000(weak) | 20(moderate) 
(D) 4000(weak) + 1(strong) | 20(moderate) 
 
50 In their papers, Tomlin and Horton also develop plausible principles which these different 
developments of the Relevance View violate, to show where these developments go wrong. Rather 
than restating these principles here, I take the counter-intuitive results enough to warrant rejection. 
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In (C), the weak claims are enough to outweigh the moderate claims, so we are required to serve the 
LHS. However, the addition of a strong claim in (D) now disables the weak claims with which it is 
aligned. Because the moderate claims are enough to outweigh the strong claim alone, we are now 
required to serve the RHS. 
Both Anchor by Competition and Anchor by Strength are called Global Relevance views because 
claims are either relevant to the competition or they are not relevant to the competition. Local 
Relevance was proposed in response to these problems by Victor Tadros (2019). Local Relevance tells 
us that all claims have the potential to outweigh competing claims to which they are relevant. Local 
Relevance has problems of its own, but these problems are at least more palatable. 
(E) 1(strong) | 4000(weak) 
(F) 1(strong) + 20(moderate) | 4000(weak) + 20(moderate) 
In (E), the strong claim disables the weak claims, and so we have a duty to satisfy the strong claim. In 
(F) the moderate claims added to the RHS are enough to outweigh either the strong claim or cancel the 
moderate claim added to the LHS. Allowing the moderate claims to cancel each other would leave us 
in the same situation as (E). However, we can avoid invoking the disabling relation by having the 
moderate claims on the RHS outweigh the strong claim and having the weak claims outweigh the 
remaining moderate claims. It might seem odd that the verdict of (E) differs from that of (F), even 
though the claims added to either side in (F) are the same. However, Tadros (2019, p.181) argues that 
this is not so implausible. Adding the moderate claims to the first case gives “defeating power” back 
to, or “activates”, the weak claims in virtue of being relevant to moderate claims. Because the weak 
claims are now relevant, they can do the outweighing work that they could have done in (E) had they 
not been disabled.51  
6.2.1 Kamm on irrelevant utilities 
Frances Kamm (1998, p.101) has advanced another kind of example that has been used to support the 
Relevance View. This example poses another challenge to Local Relevance. Kamm suggests that 
when an agent can only save one of two lives, the fact that saving one of those lives will also allow the 
agent to prevent the headache of another person should not be able to tip the balance in favour of 
saving that life. Kamm thinks that determining which life should be saved on the basis of a single 
headache would be unfair to the person whose claim is thwarted. These cases, Kamm suggests, 
 
51 There is another question about whether irrelevant claims can break ‘almost-ties’. Brown (2019, 
p.16) puts it well when he suggests that “[i]f one allows irrelevant harms to break ties, then there 
seems little justification for not allowing them also to break almost-ties, especially given that an 
almost-tie can be arbitrarily close to a tie.” Tadros (2019, p.178) is also favourable to this option. At 
first this move seems ad hoc. However, the contribution of minor claims could be capped. Weak 
claims cannot defeat strong claims, but weak claims and moderate claims can defeat strong claims.  
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demand a coin toss. To use the language introduced earlier, claims against headaches are just not 
relevant to claims against death. 
Kamm’s example is inconsistent with Local Relevance because once we are at a tie with respect to the 
two death, the single headache because locally relevant and so is able to break the tie. However, one 
reason the Kamm’s example seems compelling is that a single headache is within the margin of error 
for what is at stake between the two individuals that face the prospect of death. It is incredibly unlikely 
that the only difference between what is at stake for the two death-threatened individuals is equivalent 
to a mere headache. For example, one individual may have completed a major life project while the 
other is yet to achieve one.  
However, one problem with Kamm’s example is that even if a single headache could not tip the 
balance, it is plausible that a large number of headaches could. Suppose, for example, that we could 
fund a drug that would save the life of A or we could fund a cheaper drug that could save the life of B 
and because it was cheaper, we could also fund a year of paracetamol to a million people. Surely, it 
would not be unfair to A to choose the second option.  
I think the correct way to accommodate the intuition from Kamm’s example with Local Relevance, is 
to concede that fairness has some weight in these cases without giving up the idea that headaches 
should count for something (Hirose 2015; Tadros 2019). All we need to do is be open to pluralism 
about what is important when claims compete. Satisfying the strongest set of claims is one 
consideration, but fairness is another consideration. In Kamm’s example, perhaps fairness is the 
dominating consideration because the difference between what is stake between the two individuals is 
in the same ball park. However, when we consider one million people’s claims to have their headache 
ameliorated becoming aligned with one of the death-threatened individuals, for example, it becomes 
less plausible that fairness is the decisive consideration. 
I conclude this section by reiterating that Local Relevance is a promising development of the 
Relevance View.52 Moreover, Kamm’s tie-breaking argument should not be used to motivate the 
Relevance View as it appeals to an external consideration. 
6.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored how the Relevance View can be extended beyond homogenous one-
many cases and the various challenges that this presents. In §6.1 I considered three-way choices that 
seem to give rise to intransitive relations. I argued that this intransitivity is not obviously troubling. 
First, these kinds of situations come up elsewhere in ethics. Second, resolving the tension is a matter 
of specifying the view, not a problem with the view itself. In §6.2 I considered complex two-way 
 
52 I note here that Aart Van Gils and Patrick Tomlin have a paper coming out where they identify 
several ambiguities with Local Relevance. These problems arise out of trying to specify Local 
Relevance further to handle larger groups.  
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choices. Local Relevance looks like the best refinement of the Relevance View. Moreover, Kamm’s 
tie-breaking argument should not be used to motivate the Relevance View as it appeals to the external 
consideration of fairness. 
Local Relevance will have some bearing on worries about prioritisation presented in the last chapter. 
Perhaps we need not appeal to an independent moral mandate to accommodate the treatment of minor 
ailments. Instead the fact that competing claims are come in a spectrum in public healthcare settings 
means that minor claims will often be justified because they are ‘locally’ relevant to more significant 
claims.53 
This chapter concludes the five substantive chapters of this thesis. I have aimed to limit the scope of 
the Relevance View in numerous ways for both theoretical and practical reasons. All of these 
restrictions make the Relevance View less revisionary. But does this mean that the Relevance View 
has no real-world import? This is one of the questions I will explore in the conclusion. 
 
 




The aim of this thesis is to offer a general defence of the Relevance View. The Relevance View tells 
us when claims of one strength can outweigh claims of another strength. When claims compete, the 
fact that one kind of claim is sufficiently weaker than a competing kind of claim means that the 
weaker claims, regardless of their number, cannot outweigh the stronger claim. The thought is that 
these weaker claims are not relevant considerations when they compete with such strong claims. In 
this, the final chapter, I will first offer a summary of the arguments presented and conclusions reached 
in Chapters 2–6. I will then draw some general conclusions from my discussion and point out some 
areas for future research. 
7.1 Chapter summaries 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis were centrally concerned the theoretical basis of the Relevance View. 
The goal of Chapter 2 was to establish the best rationale for the Relevance View. While the Relevance 
View can accommodate two important intuitions, without something further to be said in its favour it 
would appear ad hoc. I followed Nagel in arguing that Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation are 
appealing in the divergent ways they understand equal moral concern. Pure Aggregation understands 
equal moral concern in terms of claims adding and subtracting in their contributions to the moral 
quality of an act. Anti-Aggregation treats equal moral concern as making pairwise comparisons, 
staying close to each person’s own viewpoint, and satisfying the strongest individual claim. 
I next differentiated the Relevance View from other views such as the Threshold View, Maximin, and 
Scanlon’s tie-breaking argument. This opened the door for me to defend the Relevance View within a 
deontological framework. The last task of Chapter 2 was to find an independent rationale for the 
Relevance View. I rejected Voorhoeve’s test for two reasons: one-one duties do not obviously 
translate into one-many duties, and the idea of preferring that another person’s claim be served 
suffered from a tracking problem. Finally, I argued that the Relevance View was best understood as a 
property of Weak Aggregation (Walen forthcoming). As a burden is distributed, the claims that it 
grounds aggregate less and less strongly. I also explored a value that might underlie Weak 
Aggregation. The value of solidarity seemed important. When a burden is distributed, the many are 
“sharing the weight” and thereby “taking the load off another’s shoulders.” 
In Chapter 3, I responded to sceptical arguments against the intuitions that motivate the Relevance 
View. These arguments aimed to show that we are imagining the World Cup and Life versus 
Paraplegia cases incorrectly and they are thereby eliciting the wrong intuitions. I argued contrary to 
these arguments that we have good reason to trust our intuitions in these cases. Of course, our 
intuitions could be wrong, but a more convincing full-blooded comparative endeavour would be 
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needed to show why this is the case. One alternative to accepting the truth of the Relevance View was 
that the Relevance View was justified on grounds on moral uncertainty: we should use Pure 
Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation in different cases as a way of minimising how wrongly we act if it 
turns out that one of these rationales is false. However, the Relevance View has parsimony in its 
favour. Neither does it merely gain credibility by sharing characteristics with these two views. As I 
argued, the Relevance View does have its own unique rationale. 
The remaining substantive chapters of this thesis were united in that, taken together, they were a 
general attempt to limit the counter-intuitive or revisionary implications of the Relevance View. In 
Chapter 4, I outlined two general reasons to limit the scope of the Relevance View by appealing to 
intrapersonal considerations. It is plausible that we should not be guided by the Relevance View when 
doing so would make everyone worse off. There is another plausible intrapersonal justification for 
taking certain kinds of social risks. I argued that when it is in everyone’s ex ante interest (at each 
moment in time) then we should take such risks. Indeed, any theory of beneficence must tolerate some 
risk-taking on the part of others in order to preserve the congruence with an individual’s pursuit of a 
good life (one where they are not impoverished by excessive risk-aversion). We should nonetheless be 
cautious when using ex ante reasoning. We cannot just adopt any policy that will be in everyone’s ex 
ante interests. I argued that we should adopt Frick’s decomposition test for assessing whether a risk is 
permissible. 
In Chapter 4, I also considered two objections to my restricted use of ex ante reasoning. First was the 
objection from dependent risk. I concluded that while dependent risk looked more problematic than 
independent risk, it is not problematic enough to threaten the permissibility of taking social risks. The 
second objection was that ex ante reasoning gives unconstrained priority to the identified life in certain 
situations. I argued that the ex ante reasoning only applies when individuals’ interests are aligned. 
When they instead compete, as they do in the identified versus statistical life cases, we should revert 
back to the ex post reasoning (Walen forthcoming). 
In Chapter 5, I aimed to show that the Relevance View would not be implausibly revisionary in certain 
settings. First, the consideration of self-interest may generate independent reasons to treat minor 
ailments over more severe diseases. Following Voorhoeve (2017), we could see the provision of 
services for minor ailments as coming from additional funding that would not otherwise be available. 
The second area where the Relevance View looked implausibly revisionary is where one group 
imposes a small risk of a significant harm on another group for the sake of a relatively trivial benefit. I 
used the examples of convenience driving and the consumption of peanuts. I argued that we cannot 
always just conjure together a situation that looks like a violation of the Relevance View. We must 
have good reason to think that the acts in question agglomerate meaningfully. 
In the final substantive chapter of this thesis, I looked at different proposals to extend the Relevance 
View beyond conflicts between two homogenous groups. I argued that non-consequentialism is well 
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placed to handle the supposed intransitivity that arises from the view in such settings. The problem of 
resolving intransitive sets of competing claims was one of disambiguating the Relevance View and not 
that the view is self-defeating. I also agreed with the current state of the literature that Local Relevance 
(Tadros 2019) is the best development of the Relevance View. 
7.2 General conclusions 
One of my overall strategies in this thesis was to bring numerous resources from deontology to bear on 
the Relevance View. In Chapter 2 I noted that there are at least four reasons to favour deontology that 
should now be even more apparent at this end of the thesis. The first was that violating the Relevance 
View displays a kind of disrespect towards the person with the strongest claim, and this places a 
constraint on an agent that is independent of whether or not acting in this way brings about the best 
state of affairs. A second reason was that the transitivity issues outlined in Chapter 6 are not as 
problematic for the deontologist as they are for the consequentialist. A third reason to favour 
deontology is that it makes sense of the notion of waiving one’s claim that I made use of in Chapters 4 
and 5 to explain why agents may be able to act in people’s ex ante interests even though this would 
give rise to a pattern of ex post claims that seem to violate the Relevance View. A fourth reason to 
favour deontology concerned the structure of two kinds of defeating relation that show up elsewhere in 
deontology: disabling and outweighing. Sometimes different considerations seem to pull against each 
other and the relative weight of each consideration is decisive. Other times different considerations 
seem to pull in opposite directions but one considerations strips another consideration of its normative 
force (e.g., a doctor operating on a patient without their consent). This follows the structure of the 
Relevance View. 
Whether the Relevance View is theoretically superior to other competing views or whether it should 
form the basis of real-world decision making, is a topic for another day. I accept that for practical 
reasons mainstream theories of distributive justice––such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and 
egalitarianism––may be indispensable. Certain problems may be too complex for us to follow the 
Relevance View. As was made clear in Chapter 6, agencies would not only have to give every health-
burden a weighting but also determine which other burdens it is relevant to. Future research should 
weigh these considerations—practical utility and theoretical truth—against one another. 
In light of the Relevance View’s potentially practical failings, I want to acknowledge that this there is 
new and challenging work coming out all the time that bears on the central themes of this thesis. One 
paper worth mentioning is by Van Gils and Tomlin (forthcoming). Van Gils and Tomlin (forthcoming) 
argued that Tadros’s Local Aggregation is itself underspecified. In their paper they point out that some 
of the most promising specifications lead to further counter-intuitive results or yield their own 
ambiguities. Merely identifying ambiguities is not knock down argument for the Relevance View, it 
merely shows that it needs further development in certain complex settings. Nevertheless, engaging 
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with these ambiguities is definitely a task for defenders of the Relevance View to consider in the near 
future.54 
During the course of this research project, I discovered that many areas of public policy make 
assumptions about aggregation. In future research it would be interesting to see if justifications along 
the lines of the Relevance View are used or could valuably be used in these contexts. In the more 
dynamic domain of public debate, I think that a wider awareness of the Relevance View may help us 
overcome certain impasses. The Relevance View identifies a particular kind of complaint that needs to 
be taken seriously: “their claims are not relevant to mine!” Before we even begin thinking about 
aggregation, we need to ask whether the respective claims are relevant to one another. If one set of 
claims is not relevant, then there is no point in debating which factors should be included and how 
much weighting we need to give when determining which claims to serve. To use a controversial but 
illustrative example, we may not need to settle whether society’s combined pleasure from eating meat 
outweighs the suffering of certain animals if everyone gets on board with the idea that our pleasure 
may not be relevant to their suffering. Some parties to a moral decision may agree that some minor 
claims appear trivial in light of more pressing competing claims but because of a theoretical 
commitment to Pure Aggregation, they may feel uncomfortable taking a position on whether these 
trivial claims could outweigh the more pressing claim(s). The Relevance View undercuts this worry by 
valuing the initial intuition that some considerations should not be counted.  
With this all said, I do not believe that something as abstract as the Relevance View is in the game of 
reforming our practices. However, to quote Hirose (2015): “there are various things we should expect 
out of ethics, and that clarifying the structure of ethical thinking is one of them” (p.222). I believe the 
Relevance View does just that. The Relevance View amounts to a theoretically plausible middle way 
between Pure Aggregation and Anti-Aggregation. It explains how we can hold onto two intuitions that 
initially seem incompatible. Moreover, if Weak Aggregation is the correct rationale for the Relevance 
View, then the Relevance View also brings our attention to how solidarity enters into our distributive 
justice judgements. This value terminates in the position where we collectively refuse to let burdens 
fall on some where smaller burdens can be borne by others.  
 
54 Another area of particularly relevant contemporary work is to do with the notion of decomposition 
in deontology. I relied on Frick’s decomposition test to constrain ex ante rules in Chapter 4. Gordon‐
Solmon (2019) has recently criticised Frick’s proposal on the grounds that it cannot make the morally 
important distinction between acts that involve two decisions and acts that make future decisions 
impossible. Both Frick and Gordon‐Solmon are writing in the context of contractualism, so it is not 
clear exactly how the worries of Gordon-Solomon would translate to the Relevance View. Walen’s 
(forthcoming) wonderful paper that I have engaged with quite a bit throughout this thesis also 
discusses issues to do with decomposition. In that paper he responds to several arguments from Horton 
(2017) and Hare (2016) that find problems with using the ex post model for risk. Horton and Hare 
variously show that where acting one way in certain cases seems to violate a deontological 
requirement, these wrongful acts can decompose into smaller acts that are each morally required. 
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Appendix A 
An Alternative Response to the Argument from Risk 
In Chapter 4, I argued that the Relevance View is consistent with taking productive social risks. 
Respecting the Unity of Individuals requires that agents tolerate taking some risk on the part of others. 
Because social risks involve gambling on the possible futures of the same individuals, taking social 
risks are not bona fide interpersonal trade-offs and so lie outside the scope of the Relevance View. 
However there is an alternative strategy that preserves the permissibility of taking risks on behalf of 
individuals that may be consistent with the Relevance View. Consider again the following stylised 
public health emergency from §4.3.1: 
One million children have contracted a virus. If the public health agency does nothing, all 
one million children will be ill for one week and then die. The public health agency can 
produce one of two vaccines that must be taken by all one million children to be effective. 
Vaccine 1 is certain to save the life of each child but will do nothing for their being ill for 
one week. 
Vaccine 2 is certain to prevent each child from being ill for one week and save their life, 
apart from a 1 in 100,000 chance that it does nothing.55 
The Argument from Risk challenges the Relevance View by arguing that if, according to the 
Relevance View, selecting Vaccine 2 in the multi-person case is impermissible, individual gambles are 
also impermissible. But individual gambles are permissible, so the Relevance View is false. Take the 
following case of an individual risk: 
Joe has contracted a virus that will cause him to be ill for one week and then die; Joe’s 
doctor has the choice of giving him just one of the two following vaccines: 
Vaccine 1 is certain to save Joe’s life but will do nothing for his being ill for a week. 
Vaccine 2 is most likely to save Joe and relieve him of any illness, apart from a 1 in 
100,000 chance that it does nothing.  
The problem is that it seems perfectly permissible for Joe’s doctor to choose Vaccine 2 in this case. 
His chances of dying are so small that it is clearly in his personal interest to take this gamble rather 
than be ill for a week.56 Any theory of beneficence should tolerate some level of risk taking on the part 
of others if it is not to be radically out of line with people’s own reasonable risk preferences. However, 
there does not seem to be any important moral difference between the individual risk and the multi-
person risk; the multi-person risk is just the individual risk taken by many children. So, we might 
 
55 Adapted from Dougherty (2013) and Frick (2015). 
56 Perhaps a certain amount of risk aversion is justified, but too much risk aversion is a sure way of 
ruining one’s life. I like to imagine a hermit who will not leave the house and keeps the doors 
constantly locked. 
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conclude that selecting Vaccine 2 in the multi-person case is also permissible, and if this involves an 
impermissible trade-off, then the Relevance View is false: 
(1) If the Relevance View is true, then selecting Vaccine 2 in the multi-person case is not 
permissible. 
(2) If selecting Vaccine 2 in the multi-person case is not permissible, then selecting Vaccine 2 in 
the individual risk case is not permissible. 
a. The multi-person case is just the conjunction of acts of the same sort as the individual 
risk case. 
b. The permissibility of an act is the same as the permissibility of a conjunction of acts of 
the same sort. 
(3) Selecting Vaccine 2 in the individual risk case is permissible. 
(4) Therefore, the Relevance View is false. 
 
Premise (3) is hard to dispute. Not only is taking individual risks of this nature ubiquitous, but any 
plausible theory of self-interest would agree that Vaccine 2 is better for Joe than Vaccine 1 in the 
individual risk case. There would be an odd asymmetry if our theory of beneficence did not similarly 
tolerate taking some risk on the part of others. Therefore, the other two ways to resist the Argument 
from Risk are to reject premise (1) or to reject premise (2). To reject (1) is to claim that selecting 
Vaccine 2 in the multi-person case does not violate the Relevance View because there is an important 
moral difference between choices made under uncertainty and choices made under certainty (such as 
the World Cup case). This is my preferred solution, for which I argue in Chapter 4. The other option is 
to reject (2). This has been a popular move in the literature. The easiest way to reject (2) is to show 
that the multi-person risk is not morally equivalent to the single-person risk. I will now show that 
various attempts to do this do not succeed. One general reason I think that this strategy does not 
succeed is that it fails to capture the distinctive inappropriateness of trading weak claims against much 
stronger claims. 
A.1 Differentiating between social risk and individual risk  
In the following sub-sections I will explore the second of the two ways to resist the Argument from 
Risk. This involves rejecting premise (2) which states that if selecting Vaccine 2 in the multi-person 
case is not permissible, then selecting Vaccine 2 in the individual risk case is not permissible. 
There is a precedent in ethics (and particularly deontology) for differentiating between an act and a 
conjunction of acts of the same sort. What is distinctive about one person receiving Vaccine 2 is that 
they themselves are not likely to die. In fact, any given person is expected to benefit greatly from 
receiving the vaccine. Everyone has the expected benefit of not being ill for a week minus the heavily 
discounted likelihood of death. However, after a certain number of people receive the vaccine, the 
chance that someone will die is exceptionally high. 
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Personal wrongness 
Consider a case where I can use my boat to save some number of people at risk of drowning in the 
ocean.57 For every additional person that I rescue, the chance that my boat will sink increases, and I 
know that if I rescue everyone my boat is almost guaranteed to sink. The single act of saving any one 
person may be morally required, but this does not mean that saving all of them is morally required. 
Indeed, there is some range of cases where I save incrementally more people, within which saving 
another person becomes impermissible. 
Can an analogy be made with the vaccine case? Could we say that the nature of the conjunction of acts 
changes when (say) at least one death becomes sufficiently more likely? This move is unlikely to 
work. In the example of the rescue boat, the act of rescuing everybody is different from the act of 
saving just a few, because after some number of rescues every additional rescue threatens the lives of 
those already rescued. This is not what happens in the vaccine case. Everyone’s risk is independent 
there; later acts do not threaten to make anyone vaccinated earlier worse off in any way. 
For these reasons the direct appeal to personal wrongness will not work. Next I will consider 
impersonal wrongness. 
Impersonal wrongness 
Some egalitarians believe that inequality is impersonally bad; that is, at least part of what is wrong 
about bringing about unequal outcomes is independent of the concern for the worst off individuals. 
One might argue that this inequality is enough to show that the individual risk case is different from 
the social risk case. However, this response would miss the mark. We are interested in the distinct 
wrong that comes from violating the Relevance View’s method of aggregating claims. Impersonal 
inequality may be a count against taking the social risk, but we are after a verdict that comes from the 
Relevance View itself. Nonetheless, we might be inspired by this appeal to impersonal wrongness and 
conclude that Vaccine 2 is also impersonally wrong simply because of the pattern of harm that it 
brings about. However, this move will not work either. What is important about the Relevance View is 
the distinctive kind of disrespect we show to the person with the stronger claim when we trade 
irrelevant claims against that person’s stronger claim. This distinctive kind of disrespect is not an 
impersonal value; instead, it is directed at the person with the stronger claim. This impersonally bad 
outcome could be objectionable; it could even make the conjunction of acts wrong all things 
considered, but this is not an implication of the Relevance View. 
A role-based ethical idea 
Deontology readily makes use of agent-relative duties. One simple example of this is special 
obligations that come out of close relationships. In the healthcare setting, doctors may have different 
 
57 This case is inspired by a case presented by Kirkpatrick (2018). 
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concerns than public health agencies. Whereas doctors may be centrally concerned with the health of 
their patients, public health agencies may be legitimately concerned with wider-population patterns. 
(That the duty of doctors is not directly derived from public health goals is evident, for example, in 
“conscientious objection”.) 
Along these lines, we could say that the doctor qua doctor is justified in administering the Vaccine 2, 
but the state is not permitted to mandate the Vaccine 2 programme because the scope of its 
considerations include the entire population. Perhaps the state’s power is overriding, and so the duty of 
Joe’s doctor is merely conditional–conditional on not being overridden by a higher authority. As I 
argued in Chapter 5, demarcating the spheres that the state may legitimately characterise as involving 
interpersonal trade-offs is important. But for the Argument from Risk currently under discussion, 
merely pointing to different authorities does not show why these authorities should view the situation 
differently. 
More analogies with equality 
If Vaccine 2 is administered in the multi-person case, it is almost certain that some children will die 
and everyone else will escape incurring any burden. One way of justifying the ex post model would be 
to see if it makes sense of other relational values under risk, such as equality. Consider the case in 
which I give one of my children $1. This seems like a nice thing to do. Now consider another case in 
which I give my other child $100. This too seems like a nice thing to do. But it seems that I might do 
better not acting at all rather than giving one of my children $1 and the other $100 (Tadros 2019, 
p.198). Even though there is a sense that each of my children benefit from my conjunction of acts, 
there remains something objectionable about acting in this way. 
The money case might seem objectionable because it may express favouritism to one of my children 
over the other. Consider the difference between giving the $100 only to my blue-eyed child versus 
giving it to the child who chooses heads in a coin toss. The latter case looks less objectionable than the 
former because both my children have equal chances of receiving the $100. However, what is 
distinctive about the case of social risk we are considering is that everyone has an equal chance of 
benefiting. Everyone has the same ex ante chances of benefiting from the vaccine. So, any complaint 
about favouritism is not available in the vaccine case. 
Suppose then that I flip a coin to determine which of my children gets the $100. Does my child who 
loses the coin toss (and receives the $1) still have any grounds for complaint? There is a sense in 
which it still looks objectionable. Perhaps it is objectionable because it exposes their vulnerability to 
receiving benefits; receiving the $1 instead of the $100 is a significant loss, and it should not have 
been. Alternatively, determining someone’s fate by a coin toss fails to recognise the importance of 
benefits to them; it trivialises the importance of the benefit to them when in fact it has great 
importance to the individual. This indirectly disrespects the person. I could have given my children 
$50.50 each, but I chose to gamble on their behalf. What this shows is that treating someone fairly is 
 69 
not identical with giving them equal chances of benefit. It shows that treating someone fairly may be 
at least partially determined by the inequality of the outcome. 
Can something analogous to the foregoing be said about the vaccine case? I think not. First, the odds 
look very different in the vaccine case. Ensuring that the outcome in the vaccine case is the same for 
everyone (i.e., choosing Vaccine 1) is not equivalent to everyone receiving $50.50, but rather 
something closer to them each receiving $5. The expected individual utility of Vaccine 2 is 20 times 
better than the expected utility of Vaccine 1. Moreover, everyone’s chances of receiving the equivalent 
of the $100 are very good: 1 in 100,000. In other words, the cost of minimising ex post objections is 
huge. 
What I take this brief discussion to have shown is that the procedure for selecting Vaccine 2 is not 
obviously objectionable. By assumption, the decision shows no prejudice to certain groups. Moreover, 
the division of goods is not arbitrary: we are not trivialising certain interests because acting on the 
basis that some people will die comes at significant costs to everyone’s ex ante interest. 
I conclude that this general strategy of differentiating between the individual risk case and the multi-
person risk case will not work. The better strategy is to accept that the multi-person risk case is 







In this appendix, I consider two epistemic assumptions that relate to the intrapersonal justifications I 
relied on in Chapters 4 and 5. First, I consider what epistemic considerations are important for an 
agent to act on the basis of ex ante justifications in social risk settings. Second, I consider an objection 
to ex ante reasoning which argues that such reasoning is epistemically irrational. 
B.1 Knowledge and ex ante justifications 
When each child has a 1 in 100,000 chance of dying by receiving Vaccine 2, this might be consistent 
with them having a 1 in 100,000 chance of having a particular gene that makes receiving Vaccine 2 
fatal. By assumption, the moral agent does not know which individuals have the fatal gene at the time 
of action, which is what makes Vaccine 2 risky. But suppose that the agent could easily attain this 
knowledge; say, by administering a simple test. This generates two distinct questions: 
(1) Is the agent required to administer the test? 
(2) If the agent can administer the test, does this itself undermine the agent’s justification for 
selecting Vaccine 2? 
To answer these questions, it is helpful to consider the single-person case again. If any given child’s 
doctor could run a simple test to determine whether or not he or she alone has the fatal genetic 
anomaly, this looks like something that would be in their interest. If any given child does not have the 
gene of interest, then there is no longer any risk for them in receiving Vaccine 2. If they do have the 
gene of interest, then we should give them Vaccine 1 and they will be more than happy to spend a 
week being ill. Let us assume that there is a minor financial cost or inconvenience associated with 
administering the test to eliminate the risk, but this seems a worthwhile inconvenience to reduce one’s 
risk of death from 1 in 100,000 to 0. From any given child’s perspective, it is like looking twice before 
they cross the road; a minor cost for reducing their risk significantly. In the single-person case, the 
agent is required to administer the test. However, the mere fact that the agent can administer the test 
does not undermine their justification for selecting Vaccine 2 because the patient may not have this 
gene. 
If we rely on the permissibility of the individual case to justify the social risk case, then it seems we 
ought to administer the test before administering Vaccine 2. However, given that it is almost certain 
that some people will have the fatal gene in our population, we might conclude, without even running 
the test, that the mere fact that we can run the test means that we have reason not to administer 
 71 
Vaccine 2. Because the fatal gene carriers are knowable, this gives the agent a duty to act against 
everyone’s ex ante interest by administering Vaccine 1 rather than Vaccine 2.58  
B.2 Epistemically irrational? A response to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 
In their paper ‘Decide as you would with full information!’, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2014) argue 
against using the ex ante model in multi-person risk cases. Their argument is most easily demonstrated 
using the dependent risk case from §4.4.1 where Vaccine 1 that will leave every child ill is contrasted 
with Vaccine 3 that is certain to be fatal for ten children but everyone else will avoid becoming ill. I 
have argued that if the agent knows the actual outcome of administering Vaccine 3, that is, knows who 
will in fact die, then administering that vaccine would be impermissible. The reason Vaccine 3 is 
permissible is that no one knows which people will die. 
The agent does know that administering Vaccine 3 is impermissible in every possible world in which 
the agent knows the outcome (i.e., who will die). Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2014, p.120) argue that if 
an action would be impermissible in every possible world in which the agent knows the outcome, then 
it would be irrational to perform this action just because one is ignorant of which world will eventuate. 
However, contrary to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2014), Frick (2014) argues that ignorance of the facts 
is morally important; it is the rationale behind everyone waiving their ex post complaint, and 
respecting this seems in many cases to be sufficient for defending the permissibility of the vaccine 
programme. 
Frick (2014, pp.136-7) also points out a fallacy in the reasoning of Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve by 
making the following parody. If I knew which of two boats will win the boat race in advance, then I 
might decide not to watch the race. I know that in one world the red boat wins and in the other world 
the blue boat wins. But this knowledge of possible outcomes does not give me the same reason not to 
watch the boat race. My knowledge that some boat will win does not give me the same reasons as my 
knowing that a particular boat will win. Thus, agents are not compelled (as a universal principle of 
rationality) to act under ignorance the same way as they would act if they had full information.59 
 
58 If there is not much cost associated with administering the test, then perhaps we should also 
administer the test but doing so is mostly redundant. Frick (2014) notes that the children would not 
want the agent to run the test because doing so would compromise their ex ante interest. I tend to think 
that consent is important in this case. If the children’s caregivers will that Vaccine 2 is administered, 
then perhaps we can do so. For a wider reaching discussion of how deontologists need to more honest 
about trading lives for money, see Fried (2018). 
59 Caspar Hare (2013, chapter 3) argues that there are some instances where it might be irrational to be 
guided by a fully informed agent. This argument relies on a controversial assumption about 
intransitive preferences, but it is worth mentioning. Suppose that I prefer A+ to A and B+ to B, but I 
have no preference of between A and B, A+ and B, and A and B+. Hare (2013) gives the example of 
having no preference when you can either save your Faberge ́egg or your wedding album in a house 
fire. He notes that the fact that you know that there is a $100 cash note next to the album in the right-
hand room does not seem to make a difference to what you should prefer to save even though when 





you prefer the latter. Now suppose that you keep the items in different rooms, but you do not know 
whether the album is in the left room or the right room. However, you do that the $100 is in the right 
room. Hare suggests that even though your fully informed self who knows which item is in which 
room may have no preference for having one item retrieved over the other, you are not rationally 
compelled to act in accordance with your fully informed self and plausibly ought to enter the room on 
the right; where you have at least one reason to favour this room because it contains $100. 
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